University of Memphis

University of Memphis Digital Commons
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
1-1-2018

Two Essays in Informational Finance in Real Estate
Frank SanPietro

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
SanPietro, Frank, "Two Essays in Informational Finance in Real Estate" (2018). Electronic Theses and
Dissertations. 1911.
https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/etd/1911

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by University of Memphis Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of University of
Memphis Digital Commons. For more information, please contact khggerty@memphis.edu.

TWO ESSAYS IN INFORMATIONAL FINANCE IN REAL ESTATE
by
Frank J SanPietro

A Dissertation
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Major: Business Administration

The University of Memphis

May 2018

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I must first thank my late parents, John and Carmela SanPietro for having taught me life’s
most valuable lessons and for their unconditional love. My precious children, Taylor Christina
Maria and Sebastian Patrick for dealing with “Dad’s boring research stuff” and their mother, Dr.
Kathryn McVicar for her steadfast encouragement. Finally, my sister Angela Scotti and her
husband Joseph Scotti without whose support and encouragement this dissertation would not
have been possible and their beautiful daughters, Jenna Teresa and Christina Marie.
I want to thank my dissertation Chair, a man who is the personification of the title
“mentor”, Dr. Mark Sunderman. My thanks also to my committee, Dr. Tom McInish, Dr. Ron
Spahr and Dr. Brian Janz for their guidance and support. Dr. Richard Evans has been a friend
and trusted advisor. I must also recognize the late Dr. C.S. Pyun, a true scholar and gentleman of
the “old school” for his guidance and encouragement. My thanks also to the faculty in the
Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate; Dr. P.K. Jain, Dr. Christine Jiang, Dr. Sandra
Mortal, Dr. Quentin Chu and Dr. Dino Silveri.
A “tip of the hat” to my program colleagues - Dr. Evgeny Radetskiy. Dr. Pawan Jain, Dr.
Bhavik Parikh, Dr. Ying Huang, K. Janean Westby-Gibson, Jared Linna, Vivek Sharma, Wei
Sun, Nap Overton, Minxing Sun, Olena Nikolsko-Rzhevska, Jade Opper Planchon with whom I
shared this journey. I must also recognize my professional colleagues, Messrs. John Simmons,
Ken Riffle, John Donahue, Dick Vosburg, CFA and Michael Mentesana for providing invaluable
“real world” perspective throughout the course of this research.
Finally, sincere thanks and appreciation to the amazing administrative professionals at the
Fogelman College of Business and Economics – Jessyka Allen, Janis Lamar, Jackie Woodall,
Ashley Holloway, Claire Grant, and Janet Hicks.

ii

PREFACE
Chapter 1 of this dissertation titled “Gentrification: A Market Microstructure Based
Explanation of a Real Estate Sub Market” with Mark Sunderman, is being prepared for
resubmission, based on comments in a revise and resubmit request, to Journal of Real Estate
Research and is formatted for this publication.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation titled “Information Theoretic Measures Use in Evaluating
Property Tax Assessment Models” with Brian Janz, Evgeny Radetskiy and Mark Sunderman, is
in press at the Journal of Property Tax Assessment & Administration and is formatted for
submission to that publication. It was the recipient of the International Association of
Assessment Officers (IAAO) 2017 Academic Partnership Program research grant.
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation research comprises two essays in informational finance in real estate.
Finance has a rich and varied literature dealing with the topic of information and its effects for
both markets and market participants. Real estate sub-markets offer a unique and productive
venue for the examination of these effects. In the essays which comprise this dissertation, we
investigate two distinct incidents of real estate markets and apply novel perspectives and
paradigms to evaluate and explain them.
Essay 1 considers the phenomenon of gentrification from a market microstructure
perspective. Specifically, we use models developed in the study of information cascades and
herding to describe agent behavior and pricing dynamics in urban real estate markets. Our
results identify pricing discrepancies that initiate the gentrification process, and characteristics of
agents most likely to recognize and capture their value. They further support the hypothesis that
gentrification is driven by the arrival of market participants who possess an informational
endowment that differs significantly from current residents and who then instigate a herding
response among their peers, which drive rental prices up in the gentrifying neighborhood.
Essay 2 addresses the nearly five-decade long discussion on vertical inequity in property
taxation. In considering the state of the discourse, we note that while practitioners and
academics differ on which is the most effective measure, they concur that no single measure can
objectively be identified as superior. We apply novel methods from Information Theory and
Bayesian Statistics to evaluate and better understand the most widely used measures of vertical
inequity in property taxation. Our results provide an objective metric which can be used to
compare measures of vertical inequity, frame the debate on measures of vertical inequity and, to
potentially assist researchers and practitioners to identify more narrowly focused solutions.
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Chapter 1
Gentrification: A Market Microstructure Based Explanation of a Real Estate Sub Market
Abstract
While gentrification has been studied for over fifty years, previous explanations have focused on
situational or sociological factors. We approach the question from a novel perspective, using a
market-based paradigm drawn from market microstructure theory. In applying this paradigm to
census data from sections of New York City, we identify pricing discrepancies that initiate the
gentrification process, and characteristics of agents most likely to recognize and capture their
value. We find that these agents create localized demand shocks which drive rental prices to and
beyond equilibrium levels. Our findings provide a promising market based direction for future
inquiry.

1

Introduction
In the over half century since it was first identified by Glass (1964), the phenomenon of
gentrification has challenged the efforts of scholars from numerous disciplines to examine and
define it. Glass defined gentrification as .an “invasion by the middle classes” into the “workingclass neighborhoods” of London. Glass’ work identified three constructs which are the
foundation of the classical gentrification paradigm; invasion, or the influx of new residents of a
different socio-economic status from the existing residents. Displacement, or the outflow of
current residents of an area, assumed to be of a lower socio-economic status than “invaders”.
Finally, deterioration, or the characterization of the condition of existing housing stock as being
older, and not well maintained. These three constructs appear in the Merriam-Webster
dictionary definition – Gentrification: the process of renewal and rebuilding accompanying the
influx of middle-class or affluent people into deteriorating areas that often displaces poorer
residents. Gentrification is a wide-spread phenomenon. According to a recent study in
Governing, of the 50 most populous cities in the United States, all had experienced some degree
of gentrification over the period from 2000 through 2014 (Maciag 2015).
The inquiry to date has been almost exclusively focused on gentrification as a
sociological phenomenon. While this is a valid perspective from which to view and examine this
phenomenon, we believe that it neglects to consider a critical element. That is, the actual market
forces which could be initiating or driving gentrification. In this paper, we take an initial step
towards a market based explanation for the causes and ongoing drivers of gentrification.
Specifically, we consider the microstructure of the gentrifying sub market and find that
finance/market microstructure theories are effective as explanations for gentrification. We
propose that sub-markets which undergo gentrification are subject to a specific type of
2

information asymmetry in the form of a “rent gap”, or as discussed in the current paper, a “pricevalue” gap.
The rent gap theory can be traced back to Smith who originally identified gentrification
as being driven by the return of investors to a specific sub-market (Smith 1979) and in a later
paper (Smith 1987) used the term “rent gap”. Smith theorized that when prices reach a certain
“floor”, investors will identify the possibility for excess return between the current price for the
land and the potential future cash flows produced by that property following investment. Putting
it simply; for Smith, the influx of capital is the key driver for gentrification, and not the type of
new residents. This economic description of gentrification contrasted sharply with the classic
paradigm as developed by Glass (1964).

Smith further refined his theory by articulating that

the rent gap serves to identify the distinction between price and value (Smith 1987). Newly
arriving residents perceive value in specific housing sub-markets in excess of their asking price.
It is this recognition of pricing “error” which attracts these agents. The initial residents
commence an informational cascade. As described by Bikhchandani, Hirshlefer and Welch
(1992), informational cascades occur when “it is optimal for an individual, having observed the
actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard
to his own information.” The subsequent informational cascade created by these participants can
provide a tractable and parsimonious explanation for at least one type of gentrification and the
corresponding behavior of rental prices in the gentrifying sub-market.
The potential clarification of explanation is an important contribution in and of itself.
Previous inquiries have faced significant logical/methodological challenges. Most importantly is
that gentrification has been largely a post-hoc descriptive effort. In a manner, reminiscent of US
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart – real estate scholars and practitioners may not be able to

3

define gentrification, but “they know it when they see it”.1 In fact, Barton (2014) notes in his
review of the literature on gentrification that the effectiveness of the study is driven by the
identification strategy.
We examine a multi-decade data set for all residential dwellings within one of the largest
“cities” in America, Kings County, NY, commonly referred to as Brooklyn. While being one of
the five boroughs which comprises New York City, Brooklyn has, for the past century been one
of the top five cities in America, when ranked by population. As of the 2010 Census, Brooklyn
had a population of over 2.5 million residents, making it the third largest city in the country after
Los Angeles and Chicago.2 In addition to being one of the largest, Brooklyn is also one of the
most diverse cities in the United States with over 45% of residents speaking a mother language
other than English as of the 2010 census.
Our dataset is compiled from four reports of the decennial US Census, specifically 1980,
1990, 2000, and 2010. The data is obtained from Minnesota Population Center. National
Historical Geographic Information System: Version 2.0. Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota 2011. As a source of data on the “housing market” overall, we use data from the St.
Louis Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) report on Quarterly Housing Prices.
Our findings could appropriately be extrapolated to other urban locations in the United
States given the population size and density of building development in Kings, (Brooklyn) NY.
Further, the population used for this paper shows broad variation in diversity, income and other
important demographic characteristics.
We contribute to the literature by applying financial and market microstructure theory to
explain the emergence and development of a distinct rental real estate sub-market within a
regional (city) wide market for real estate. We further identify the mechanism by which a price-
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value gap and subsequent informational cascade can drive the rapid and dramatic influx of new
residents which was identified as early as the initial work by Glass (1964), thus providing
linkage between the classic demographic and later economic paradigms of gentrification.
Finally, we contribute to the literature by conducting a large-scale study of gentrification using a
multi-decade data set.
Having completed the Introduction (Section I), the paper continues with the Literature
Review and Background sub-sections (Section II). The paper continues in Section III with a
description of the Data and Methods used. Section IV discusses the results and considers
additional robustness tests. The paper concludes in Section V.

Literature Review
Gentrification: Historic Context
Glass (1964) coined the term gentrification. In her work, Glass studied the movement of
professionals into formerly working-class areas of London. Glass termed this phenomenon,
gentrification, in reference to the landed gentry, or, that nobility in feudal England who derived
their status from being landowners. An important element of the Glass conceptualization of
gentrification is the idea that traditional residents of these formerly working-class neighborhoods
find themselves displaced by the newly arriving residents. Secondly, gentrification was aided by
existence of housing stock which had some historic and/or architectural significance. The
combined effects of a) location of these neighborhoods and their proximity to the urban core, b)
their architectural appeal3, and c) low prices as compared to housing in the suburbs or other more
established urban areas were the key elements in the Glass model of gentrification.
Zukin (2011) proposes that newly arriving residents to an area, i.e., the “gentry” in the
5

Glass construct, can be thought of differently. Zukin sees the gentrifiers as “a middle-class
liberal arts intelligentsia” (Thomson 2014). In the Zukin construct the new residents are those
who possess “cultural capital”: artists, writers, teachers, professors, etc. Again, we note that this
influential model of gentrification is largely focused on demographic changes in an area’s
residents.
While both the Glass and Zukin models focus on demographic changes in an area’s
residents – Zukin’s innovation to the demographic models is that she focused on a specific
attribute of the new residents. Notably that they are often better educated than the previous
residents. This difference in the level of educational attainment is important to our examination
of this phenomenon. Specifically, given the higher level of educational attainment of the newly
arriving residents, they are more likely to be engaged in creative or intellectual careers than
current residents. The difference in educational background and career choice also creates formal
and informal social network connections for these newly arriving residents which differ greatly
from those of existing residents.
In contrast to the socio-demographic explanations are those that depict gentrification as
an economic process. The most notable of these were put forth by the geographer, Neil Smith.
In his initial work on the topic, Smith (1979) proposes that gentrification has little to do with the
demographics of the newly arriving residents and much more with the arrival of investment
capital. In this work, Smith specifically refers to the “back to the city” movement at that time as
being one of capital and not of people. He theorized that when prices reach a certain “floor”,
investors will identify the possibility for excess return by identifying the difference between the
current price for the land and the potential future cash flows produced by that property following
investment. This identification of the “highest and best use” of the property and the difference
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between that level and the current cash flows being generated is a critical finding, as it serves to
establish the thresholds between “price” and “value”. Smith would formally articulate this
distinction in a later paper (Smith 1987), and refer to it as the “rent gap”. Smith notes that
gentrification is most likely to occur, not where land and real estate prices are lowest, but rather,
where there is the largest “rent gap” between actual and potential land values.4 In these
instances, the potential realization of this “hidden value” is the economic driver of gentrification.
Under rent gap theory, an area first undergoes a period of “devalorization” during which demand
for urban housing declines and the price of housing stock and rents move lower.

This lowering

in prices is followed by a reduction in upkeep, which accelerates the price decline. This is the
point at which the “rent gap” emerges. In related work, it has been shown that when presented
with an external shock, the optimal response choices of market participants serve to amplify the
initial impact of the shock (Novy-Marx 2009). This can explain both the accelerative effects of
price declines in specific real estate sub-markets, as well as increases in demand and rental rates
in other sub-markets. There is also evidence that real estate prices display different behavior
over short and long-term periods and that these price paths can be detected using a time-series
method (Birch and Sunderman 2003). Finally, Florida (2003) describes the process of
“rediscovery” of an area by new residents which is important to the market perceptions of price
vs. value. Florida points out that different residents “rediscover” the attractiveness of urban
areas, especially those areas proximal to the City Center, well served by public transportation
and which support a pedestrian-friendly life style. Recent work by Kelly and Malizia (2017) and
Pivo (2014) support the idea that access to the City Center, convenience, and pedestrian
friendliness are amenities important to these residents.
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Gentrification: Definition and Measurement Challenges
In a famous case involving the first amendment, Justice Potter Stewart was asked to
render an opinion as to whether the material in question violated the law. Stewart opined, quite
famously, that he wouldn’t be able to define the material, but he would “know it when he saw
it”. Such is the challenge faced and the standard often applied by those who write about, study,
and otherwise hope to define gentrification. In many instances, the term is applied to a
geographic area that has already undergone the beginning phases of change or has completely
gentrified. This sort of post hoc classification challenge is a prototypical instance of Justice
Stewart’s observation.
More recently, Zukin (2011) identifies gentrification by way of “markers”. These
markers refer to specific types of businesses which tend to be more common in areas that are
undergoing or have undergone gentrification. Zukin abbreviates these markers as ABC’s, which
refer to Art Galleries, Boutiques and Café’s. In contrast to the attributes-based or observational
approach to defining gentrification, some scholars have taken a more quantitative approach and
used census data as their means of measuring gentrification. One of the most cited works in this
area was done by Freeman (2005). Freeman first identified areas in cities which were “eligible”
for gentrification. Eligibility was determined by housing values which were below the median.
Gentrification was said to have occurred if the median value of homes in a specific census tract
increased at a rate greater than average for the city and, there was a simultaneous increase in
residents’ educational attainment. A combination of quantitative and qualitative measures is
used in a 2014 paper by Barton (2014).5 In that paper, the author compares the accuracy of
census based methods to a qualitative measure using incidence of the word “Gentrification” in
the New York Times. Results showed that the qualitative measures tended to underestimate the
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incidence of gentrification when compared to census based (quantitative) measures. Our paper is
in the spirit of Freeman, as it has a quantitative emphasis; however, in our study, these changes
were observed during multiple intercensial periods (1980 – 1990, 1990 – 2000). Further, in our
paper we apply a market microstructure paradigm to explain the actions of the gentrifying agents
and as a means of informing our examination of the behavior of rental prices.

Rental Market Pricing and Dynamics
Rosen and Smith’s (1983) seminal paper on the process by which rental prices for
housing adjust posited that there existed a natural vacancy rate, similar to the natural
unemployment rate. In a survey of equilibrium models used in real estate research, Hendershott
(1998) considers the natural vacancy rate and its adjustment process and proposes that rental
prices will adjust to changes between the natural and real vacancy rates. In so specifying, the
author notes that it would be possible for rents to deviate dramatically from their fundamental
value. He cites incidents in office real estate where these “bubbles” were driven by explosive
demand. Zhou (2008) showed that the natural vacancy rate for a large urban market (Chicago) is
not temporally variant. The author showed that there are break-points where the NVR does
adjust owing to changes in the macroeconomy and structural changes in the local/national
housing market.
In addition to rental price adjustment dynamics, it has been shown that excessive
regulation in the form of ceilings, or “rent controls” can have a significant effect in driving and
keeping rental prices in areas proximal to the controlled area above equilibrium. In a survey of
literature on apartments and their markets, Jud, Benjamin and Sirmans (1996) noted that several
authors observed that landlords were motivated to first underserve rent-controlled units and then
ultimately to take buildings out of service and repurpose them for other uses. This reduction in
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supply in the controlled area was shown to drive up rents in those nearby areas not subject to the
rent control regulations.

Market Microstructure and Informational Cascades
The term “market microstructure” was introduced in the mid-1970’s to describe the
technical processes by which participants in markets priced and transacted different types of
assets. (Garman 1976). Over time it has come to refer to the study of market structure and
design, price formation and price discovery, transaction costs, timing costs and information and
disclosure. It is the area of information and disclosure which will inform this examination of
gentrification. Previous work in the real estate literature have considered the idea of market
microstructure effects. Initial work, by Wang, Erickson, Gau and Chan (1995) applied theory
from the study of the microstructure of the equity markets to the study of Real Estate Investment
Trusts. Later work, by Hardin and Wolverton (2000) examine the idea of the micro-market
determinants of rental rates for retail properties.
The idea of differentially informed market participants has been examined in the
literature for decades. The cost of search was described by Stigler (1961), where the author
models the costs associated with searching for the most favorable price in each market. Stigler
notes that differences in prices in non-centralized markets have informative value; “Price
dispersion is the manifestation—and indeed it is the measure of ignorance in a market” (Stigler
1961, 214). In the current paper, the dispersion of prices between lower priced housing outside
the City Center vs. higher priced housing in the City Center will provide the catalyst for the
differentially informed market participant (renter) to identify the price-value gap and to seek to
capture that difference for themselves. While the exploitation of this quasi-informational
arbitrage is technically “rent-seeking” behavior by the new resident (they realize value
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disproportionate to their price paid) – it is operationally the failure of the property owner to
capture the additional rental value driven largely by proximity to the City Center which is the
source of the economic benefit. Exhibit 1 depicts graphically the connection between the city
center and gentrifying market rents, along with the respective rates of change over time. The
difference between the two is the “price-value” gap, which is at its largest at the beginning of
gentrification. The initial gentrifying residents have the largest informational advantage in this
quasi-informational arbitrage and thus, capture the largest economic benefit. They also initiate
the “informational cascade” thereby accelerating the increase in rental prices until the rental
prices in the gentrifying area are on par with the City Center. The mechanism by which agents
join this cascade could be either by direct communication or by observation. Cascades are
closely related to herding with one significant difference. In informational cascades, participants
choose to disregard private information in their decision making, whereas in herding, participants
incorporate private information into their decision-making process. Seiler (2015) found that
offered advice was more powerful than observed action in a decision to strategically default on a
mortgage and that this was evidence of herding and not an information cascade. In a related
work, Seiler, Lane and Harrison (2014) conducted an experiment where although a thought
leader or “maven” provided inaccurate information, participants still “followed the herd” and
used that direction to guide their decision to default on a mortgage.
In many instances, because of the “fad” effect of the informational cascade and
momentum effects in “hot” markets (Novy-Marx 2009), rental prices in the gentrifying area can
ultimately exceed those in the more established City Center. This effect was also observed by
Allen and Swisher (2000) who noted that prices for properties at a HUD auction were most
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heavily discounted at the start of the auction, and prices then rose steadily throughout the
auction.

Exhibit 1| Price-Value Gap Model

Note - In this figure, we illustrate the change in apt. rents for City Center vs. Gentrifying Areas.
The area between the colored lines represents the price vs. value difference of the two submarkets. It is “captured” by the gentrifying residents, until market forces equalize rents between
the gentrifying area and City Center. As can be seen given the momentum of rental price
increases for gentrifying areas, the last group of new residents to that area actually pay a premium
above rents for comparable apartments in the City Center.

Operational Description
Members of different sub-markets have been shown to have differential valuations
regarding housing attributes (Belasco, Farmer and Lipscomb 2012). In our scenario, the arrival

12

of a differentially informed participant in the sub market is the initiating event. As is known, real
estate markets are not as efficient as other financial markets, e.g. equities. One of the “benefits”
of this inefficiency is the potential for buyer/seller search behavior choices to have an effect on
the price. In an interesting study of a residential real estate market Cheng, Lin, Liu and Seiler
(2015) noted that in a growing market, greater search (as manifested by time-on-market, or
TOM) will lead to a higher selling price. The current study applies that finding to motivate the
idea that prospective renters will have an incentive as a gentrifying rental market “heats up” to
move quickly and secure a rental, else the market can “move against them”, leading them to pay
a higher price for their rental.
This individual is evaluating the current rent being asked against a different pricing/value
benchmark. Rather than solely considering the value of the rent being asked against the
surrounding properties (the “neighborhood”), this participant considers the value of the rent
against that being asked in the city center. Observing a marked differential between the two, for
essentially the same living space this participant (rationally) decides to take advantage of the
lower rent in the sub-market. These early adopters are the catalyst for an informational cascade
as described in the paper by Bikhchandani, Hirshlefer and Welch (1992). Through interactions
with others in their networks, they share information about the price-value differential and
expose this anomaly to other prospective renters. In their original work, the authors describe
these cascades as explanations for behavior among market participants that is precipitated by
little data. According to the authors, a cascade is a series of actions whereby an individual
disregards his own information in favor of following the behavior of those ahead of them.
We argue that the behavior of those individuals who possess superior information on the
“true value” of the properties in gentrifiable areas is a catalyst for just such cascades. Further,
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the idea of localized control is presented by Bikhchandani, Hirshlefer and Welch (1992) as an
explanation of why members of certain groups will tend to imitate one another in their choices.
In this paper, we argue that a form of localized control is present among the better-informed
participants in real estate markets undergoing gentrification. In a related work, Welch (1992)
examines the effect of limited distribution channels on pricing and finds that, in regard to initial
public offerings, the underwriting bank has limited distribution channels which allows for
participants to “learn” from the behavior of others. In our model, the initial gentrifying residents
model their behavior within their personal networks, allowing members of those networks to
learn from their behavior and benefit from it in making their own rental decisions. These later
participants would be seen as likely to be ignoring their own private information on the
desirability of property outside of the City Center and the likelihood of the rent for that property
to rise significantly in a short period of time, and to choose instead to follow the lead of early
adapters and leaders of social networks and other informal groups.

Data and Methods
Data were gathered from results of the Decennial US Census for the years 1980, 1990,
2000, and 2010. This data was gathered using the National Historical Geographic Information
System (NHGIS) of the Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota. The sample
includes all census tracts for Kings County (Brooklyn) in New York City, NY, USA. In addition
to the tract-level data collected, data on general economic conditions and housing market
conditions were collected. Data on the annual rate of economic inflation were taken from the
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. Housing price data were collected from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Data (FRED) system report of the U.S. Federal Housing
14

Finance Agency, All Transactions House Price Index (USSTHPI). Exhibit 2 presents summary
data for the entire 30-year study period. The initial data set had 3,114 census tracts across the
four sample periods. After removing observations with missing values, the final data set
contained 2,799 observations.
Exhibit 2| Descriptive Statistics

Demographic data were collected for the population size and diversity of residents. This
included data on the median age of residents and racial characteristics used to measure
15

demographic diversity. Specifically, the number of residents in each census tract who identified
themselves as Single Race-White was collected. The number of Single Race-White residents
were subtracted from the total population of the tract to provide a measure of demographic
diversity for that tract. Finally, the level of educational attainment reported by residents of each
census tract were collected. As reported by the US Census this “refers to the highest level of
education that an individual has completed. This is distinct from the level of schooling that an
individual is attending” (US Census, 2010). These were divided into two groups – total number
of residents in a census tract over the age of 18 who had an earned Bachelors degree, and total
number of residents in a census tract over the age of 18 that had pursued any post-graduate
education – whether at the Masters, Doctoral or Professional level.6 Finally, we captured the
segment of the population within a census tract that was between the ages of 18 and 35. We
believe this young adult segment has the greatest motivation to locate affordable housing and
also tend to be part of the type of networks and groups which are described in the informational
cascade literature.
Housing specific data were also collected for each census tract. Data on housing demand
was collected via reported occupancy for each census tract. Tenure (owner occupied vs.
available for rent) was collected. Median home sales price was collected. Data on the median
contract rent or the median of the cash rent asked for by the owner was collected for each census
tract. It should be noted that this value differs from median gross rent. Median gross rent is an
imputed amount for electric and fuels (assumed for heating) costs which are included to show the
“total cost” to the renter. In this paper, median contract rent was considered the more
appropriate measure as it is the standard in Brooklyn to rent apartments with basic utilities
included.
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On review of Exhibit 2, the following is identified:
(1) Brooklyn Became More Populous - The overall population of Brooklyn grew from
2,231,028 residents (1980 Census) to 2,504,700 residents (2010 Census). This represented a
growth of 12.27%, or a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 0.38% p. a. The decade of the
largest growth was between the 1990 and 2000 census where the population grew by 164,662, or
7.16%. The least growth was seen in the decade between the 2000 and 2010 census with an
increase in the population of only 1.6%, which translated into an additional 39,374 residents.
(2) Brooklyn Became More Diverse - The percentage of residents who reported
themselves as Single Race – White decreased from a high of 60.89% (1980 Census) to a low of
41.20% (2000 Census) with a slight upward adjustment to 42.80% as of the 2010 Census.
Alternatively, those residents who did not identify as Single Race - White increased from a low
of 39.11% (1980 Census) to a high of 58.80% (2000 Census) with a slight downward adjustment
to 57.20% as of the 2010 Census. This positions our study geography as ethnically and racially
diverse and would aid in the applicability of our findings to other geographies in the United
States.
(3) Brooklyn Got Older and Better Educated - The median age of residents moved
upwards from a low of 30.8 years of age (1980 Census), to a high of 34.1 years of age (2010
Census). This represented an overall increase of 10.71%, or a CAGR of 0.34% p.a. Finally, the
number of residents who were 18 years of age or older and who had not completed four years of
college declined during the three intercensial periods from a high of 63.91% (1980 Census) to a
low of 55.26 % (2010 Census). Alternatively, those residents who had completed at least 4 years
of college increased from 173,911, or 7.8% of the population (1980 Census) to 531,924
residents, or 21.24% of the population (2010 Census). Of all the attributes included in the
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present study, Educational Attainment showed the largest growth with an overall growth of
206% which represented a CAGR of 4% p.a.
(4) Brooklyn Got Expensive - The cost of housing in Brooklyn during the three
intercensial periods experienced upward pressure. Looking first at the median value of a home,
we see that this rose from a low $51,100 (1980 Census) to a high of $562,400 (2010 Census).
The largest reported growth was during the 2000-2010 intercensial period where the median
value of a single-family residence rose some $373,500 or 297.72%. For the entire study period,
the value of a single-family residence rose by $511,300, or 1101% (one thousand one hundred
percent). The CAGR for the study period was 8.32% p.a. Turning attention to the median
contract rent statistic, the changes in rent largely mirror those of the changes in the median value
of homes. We again see that the largest increase in rent was during the 2000–2010 intercensial
period with an increase of some 70% during that period. Over the entire sample period, we
observe an increase in median contract rent of 463%, which can be expressed as a CAGR of
5.24%
In summary, when examining data at the County level, we see that there was an influx of
residents, an increase in the ethnic and racial diversity (or, more precisely, a decrease in the
ethnic and racial homogeneity) of those residents, and an increase in age. The largest observed
increases are in the level of educational attainment and the median value and median contract
rent. Comparing our observed data to two broader level statistics – the rates of growth of both
the median value and median contract rent are larger than the inflation rate as reported by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics in each period. Also, the overall rate of growth and CAGR of both the
median home value and median contact rent at 1101% / 8.32% and 463% / 5.24% respectively
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are greater than the growth in the Federal Housing Authority All Transactions Data with an
overall growth over the intercensial periods of 324% and a CAGR of 4% p.a.

Quintile Rankings
Given the importance of the educational attainment attribute to the present study, we
segment the data from each decennial sample into quintile ranks based on the level of
educational attainment of residents in that census tract. Educational attainment is a composite
measure, with two variables in the data being observed, the number of residents in a census tract
that have completed at least 4 years of college (GRAD) and the number of residents in a census
tract that have completed at least 5 years of college (PGRAD). The ranks are assigned values
from highest, (0), to lowest (4). The arithmetic mean of the two educational attainment ranks is
calculated to produce the composite educational attainment rank variable. We then conduct the
same quintile ranking for the census tract median rent again with 0 being the highest rank and 4
being the lowest. A 2x2 matrix is created using the rankings for educational attainment and
median rent to group the rankings for each census tract. This is shown in Exhibit 3.
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Exhibit 3| Matrix of Educational Attainment by Median Rent

If the theoretical predictions of our microstructure based model of gentrification are
valid, then as census tracts become gentrified over time, they should move in a clockwise
direction from the starting position in the third quadrant in the bottom left of the matrix up to the
second quadrant in the upper left and finally into the first quadrant in the upper right of the
matrix. Using the same metrics, we generated scatter plots to show the distribution of residents
with higher levels of educational attainment by the level of rent that they are paying for their
apartment.

Panel Regression
Panel data methods allow the researcher to observe a cross section of subjects over time,
or dynamically (Frees 2004).7 The data in our sample is technically described as a short,
balanced macro panel. Taking each of the descriptive terms independently; a short panel is one
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with repeated observations of multiple subjects over relatively few time periods, a balanced
panel includes only those observations with values for all time periods. Finally, a macro panel is
one in which time T is relevant to the analysis. The benefit of panel data methods is their ability
to control for bias resulting from omitted variables in the model. It should be noted that the
definition of omission describes variables which are not only “missing”, but also which were
incorrectly measured or are unobservable. We conduct a panel regression using the basic model;
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝑍𝑖 𝛾 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(1a)

In equation 1a the left-hand side term, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents our variable of interest. On the
right-hand side, 𝛽0 represents the intercept or constant for the model. The next three terms
represent descriptive factors specific to the data which are important to identifying whether fixed
or random effects are appropriate in specifying the model. Proper specification is a necessary
step in achieving the benefits of panel regression. The first of the descriptive factors noted as
𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝛽 represents factors in the data which are observed and time variant. These factors can be
estimated by both fixed and random effect models. The next term, noted as 𝑍𝑖 𝛾 represents factors
in the data which are observed and time invariant. These factors may only be estimated by
random effect models. The next term, 𝑎𝑖 represents time invariant effects specific to each
subject and which remain fixed across repeated observations. These parameters, are known as
subject specific and control for differences, or, heterogeneity among subjects. The final term in
the model 𝜀𝑖𝑡 denotes the residual.
At this point a few descriptive words regarding panel data may be useful8. Panel data are
used to represent dynamic relationships (Frees 2004), where the subjects are studied through
repeated observations. The ability to observe these dynamic, or inter-temporal associations
permits the researcher to make more meaningful inferences regarding data than those which
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might be possible using static (cross-sectional) data as would be the case using standard
regression. Panel data makes use of clustering in data samples. Stated simply, clustering refers to
the characteristic that data from the same unit of analysis tend to be similar, or close to one
another in some sense. Panel data methods permit the researcher to exploit this characteristic to
develop better predictors.
In using panel data, the researcher needs to consider the issue of fixed versus random
effects. To better understand these concepts, consider the following brief examples of fixed vs.
random effects, taken from the Cambridge Dictionary of Statistics. They define fixed effects as
Effects attributable to a finite set of levels of a factor of specific interest. For example, an
investigator may wish to compare the effects of three particular drugs on a response variable. In
comparison, they define random effects using the following example: the investigator may be
interested in the effects of a particular class of drugs on a response variable, and uses a random
sample of drugs from the class in a study.
Proper specification allows us to mitigate the introduction of bias from unobserved timeinvariant factors. The first step is to consider whether the data should be analyzed using fixed
effect (FE) or random effect (RE) assumptions about the correlation between the time-invariant
(fixed) variables and the observed explanatory variables. In the RE case, there is an assumption
that no correlation exists between the time-invariant and observed explanatory variables. In
terms of econometric methods, this is considered a stronger assumption, and provides the benefit
of greater efficiency when using the RE model. Stated in terms of our basic panel data
specification, we assume that H0: Cov(αi, xit) = 0. If this is the case, then both the FE and RE
estimators will be consistent. However, the RE will be more efficient because the SE of the RE
estimator will be less than that of the FE estimator.
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Alternatively, in the case of the FE model, the “no correlation” assumption is relaxed. In
this case we would depict this as H1: Cov(αi, xit) ≠ 0 . In this instance, we find that only the
fixed effects model is consistent.
The Hausman test compares the consistency of the estimators to determine whether or not
the null hypothesis, H0: Cov(αi, xit) = 0, can be accepted. If so, then RE estimators can be used.
If not, then FE estimators are to be used. We analyze the data using the Hausman test to identify
whether our regression model should employ FE or RE assumptions.9
For our sample of 572 census tracts observed at each of four decennial censuses, we
estimated four regression models. The models were created to examine the effects of specific
variables on the median rental price of housing in the sample. The regression specifications are
presented in four models, as follows:
𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝐴𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(1)

𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐻𝑂𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(2)

𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑊𝐻𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑊𝐻𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑌𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(3)

𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝐴𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑌𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(4)

where 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 is the median rent of housing of census tract 𝑖 in year 𝑡, BACH is the
number of individuals with a college degree and PGRAD is the number of individuals that have
completed at least some post-graduate education. For the second model, the variable HOUSTOT
is the number of houses, OWNOCC is the number of owner occupied living units, RENTOCC is
the number of units occupied by renters, and POPTTL is the total population. For the third
model, POPNONWHT is the total non-white population, POPWHT is the total white population,
and POPYNG is the number of residents aged 18-35. The fourth model is an enhanced version
of the first model with the addition of the POPYNG variable (number of residents aged 18-35).
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The variables described are obtained from the results of the decennial census for the years
1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 in 572 census tracts yielding 2,288 observations. Model I was the
most parsimonious model, in which Med Rent was compared to changes over time in the number
of residents who had completed at least four years of college and the number of residents who
had completed at least five years of college. Model II considers the supply of available housing
by comparing Med Rent with the total housing available, the tenure of the housing supply, i.e.,
whether that housing is owner occupied or available for rental and the total population in a
census tract. Model III considers the effect of demographic elements on the median rent
examining the connection among the non-white population, the white population, and the young
adult demographic. Finally, Model IV considers the elements in Model I while adding the
young adult demographic variable. The intuition for this model’s construction is to clarify the
changes observed in Model I. In that model, changes in median rent were examined relative to
changes in the education level of the residents in a census tract. An obvious question regarding
any results would be to consider whether the rents grew because more educated residents moved
into a tract or, considering that education is a proxy for income and other SES variables, the rents
rose for an unobserved reason, and consequently, residents coming into the area were higher
SES, which includes changes in the income of new residents. This thought is considered by
including the POPYNG specification, as it specifically looks at the changes in the resident
population between the ages of 18 and 35.
Exhibit 4 provides a listing of variables along with their description.
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Exhibit 4| Variable Descriptions
Variable Name

Description

Population

Total Number of Individuals Residing in a Geographic
Area

Median Age

The age which divides the population into two
numerically equal groups; that is, half the people are
younger than this age and half are older

White (Race- Alone)

Individuals who report themselves as solely belonging to
the White Race, as defined by the Office of Management
and Budget as “a person having origins in any of the
original peoples of Europe, the Middle East or North
Africa”

Non White (Race Alone or in
Combination)

All individuals other than those who report as White
(Race-Alone)

Total Housing Units

All housing units whether vacant or occupied within a
specific geographic boundary

Occupied Housing Units

Housing units which are the usual place of residence of
those living in it at the time of the census

Owner Occupied Housing
Units

Owner or Co-Owner reported as living in the unit

Renter Occupied Housing
Units

All occupied housing units which are not owner occupied

Median Home Value

The price which divides the into two numerically equal
groups; that is, half the homes are priced below and half
the homes are priced above

Median Contract Rent

The cash rent (excluding utilities which divides the
distribution into two equal parts

Under 4 years of College

Individuals, 18 years of age and older who have not
completed four years of college

4 years of College

Individuals, 18 years of age and older who have
completed four years of college

5 or more years of College

Individuals, 18 years of age and older who have
completed five or more years of post-graduate education

Rate of Inflation for
Intercensial Decade

The Bureau of Labor Statistics rate of inflation calculated
for the intercens

FHA Index of All Housing
Transactions

The Federal Housing Administration Index of All
Housing Transactions Price Index – 1980 = 100
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Results and Discussion
Our main hypothesis is that gentrification is a process which is begun by informed market
participants (represented by having higher levels of educational attainment as compared to those
currently residing in an area). These differentially informed market participants exploit a quasiinformational arbitrage between the rents being asked in the city center and those in proximally
located outlying areas. This anomaly is referred to as the price-value gap. As they capture the
value between the “bargain” rent in the gentrifying area, they commence an informational
cascade which accelerates the influx of new residents. The increased demand puts pressure on
rental prices in the gentrifying area and raises them to be at, or in some cases to exceed, the level
of rents being demanded in the city center. To test this hypothesis, we examine the changes in
the census tracts within Kings County (Brooklyn), NY.
Some research examining gentrification has instead focused primarily on changes in
household income. However, many of the first residents to “gentrify” a neighborhood are often
artisans or young professionals with incomes similar to their new neighbors. Such changes to a
community are not accurately reflected by analyzing income levels. For this reason, we instead
measured changes in educational attainment, which is a strong indicator of changes to a
community which are not driven by endogenous change in the existing residents. This approach
is similar to that used by Maciag (2015).
We begin by analyzing our data to determine whether fixed effects (FE) or random effect
(RE) assumptions would be more appropriate for our regression model. This is done by using the
Hausman Specification test to identify the presence of endogeneity in predictor variables. The
results of this test will specify whether FE or RE is more appropriate when running the panel
regression. We ran the Hausman Specification test and obtained the results presented in Exhibit
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5.

As is seen in the Exhibit, all four model specifications had high values for the Hausman test.

These extreme values for the Hausman statistic indicate that the RE model is inconsistent and
that the use of FE would be the preferred method.
Exhibit 5| Hausman Test Statistics

Specification

Hausman Test Statistic

p-value

Preferred Model

Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4

805.77
759.74
487.86
786.63

<.00
<.00
<.00
<.00

Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects

Note: This Exhibit presents the Hausman test statistics for the four main regression
specifications estimated when using fixed effects vs. random effects. Extreme values of
the statistic indicate that the random effects model is inconsistent, and the fixed effects
model is the preferred specification.

Accordingly, panel regressions were run using FE specifications.
We then specify our models and use these to run four panel regressions. The model
specifications are as follows (these are the same models shown the previous section) –
𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝐴𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(1)

𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐻𝑂𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(2)

𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑊𝐻𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑊𝐻𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑌𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(3)

𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝐴𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑌𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(4)
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Exhibit 6| Panel Regression Results
Model 1
BACH
1.30***
(.063)
PGRAD
0.51***
(.101)

Constant
R
Squared
Within
Between
Overall
N

137.90***
(14.337)

0.63
0.27
0.33
2,288

Model 2
HOUSTOT 1.63***
(.387)
OWNOCC
0.95**
(.43)
RENTOCC -1.18***
(.38)
POPTTL
.17***
(.032)
Constant
-1307.03
(144.462)

n

Model 3
POPNWHT
0.35***
(.021)
POPWHT
0.16***
(.032)
POPYNG
-0.01
(.009)

Constant

0.43
0.01
0.05
2,288

n

-209.04***
(80.502)

0.22
0.16
0.00
2,288

Model 4
BACH
1.30*
(0.063)
PGRAD
0.51***
(0.101)
POPYNG
-0.01
(0.006)

Constant

n

147.67***
(15.679)

0.63
0.28
0.33
2,288

Note: This Exhibit presents estimates of coefficients of the independent variables for four different regression
specifications using the fixed effects model. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In the case of Model 1 – the intuition is rather straightforward – does the change in the
level of education of the residents of a census tract influence the median rent. As is shown in
Exhibit 6, the variables BACH and PGRAD are both significant at the .01 level. We note that
Model I has a within group R2 of .63 indicating that the model has moderately strong explanatory
power when considering individual census tracts over time.
For Model II, the intuition is to identify supply and demand characteristics effect on
median rent by examining total housing available, the tenure of the housing supply (i.e., whether
that housing is owner occupied or available for rental), and the total population in a census tract.
We observe that the coefficients for housing supply (HOUSTOT) and census tract residents
(POPTTL) are both significant at the 99% level. Further, the coefficient for owner occupancy is
also significant at the 95% level. The coefficient for the degree of rental occupancy in a census
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tract (RENTOCC) is significant at the 99% level; however, the sign of the coefficient is negative.
This is reasonable as one would expect that a decrease in the availability of rental housing in an
area will lead to an increase in the price of the remaining supply. Model II has a within group Rsquared of .43, showing moderate explanatory power for this model, but lower than that provided
by Model I.
For Model III, we examine the effects of demographic characteristics of the residents of a
census tract on the median rent by examining the interplay of racial and age related
characteristics. The change in racial characteristics have significant regression coefficients at the
99% level; however, this has a simple explanation. The composition of the POPWHT and
POPNWHT variables can be thought of as discrete elements of the POPTTL variable, therefore
the response of the independent variable could simply be to the increase in demand driven by
population growth. The POPYNG coefficient is negative and does not demonstrate statistical
significance. Finally, the within group R squared for Model III is .22, indicating low explanatory
power, and is much lower than either of the two previous models.
Model IV repeats the specification of Model I with the addition of the POPYNG
variable. The BACH variable (four years of college) retains statistical significance; however, it
changes from the 99th percentile in Model I, to the 90th percentile in the current model. PGRAD
(five years or more of college) is still significant at the 99th percentile. The POPYNG variable
was added to this model to clarify the change due to educational level and identify whether the
change in education level of census tract residents was driven by primarily younger new
residents. In this model POPYNG is again negative and does not display statistical significance.
However, the within group R squared for Model IV is at the same level as that of Model I, .63
indicating that Model IV also has strong explanatory power. This maintenance of explanatory
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power may be the result of a lag effect. This effect can be described as increased in-migration of
younger, better educated residents who are occupying the “fringe” sections of desirable areas and
raising the level of educational attainment without having a simultaneous increase in the median
contract rent.
In summary, we tested four models and observed their level of explanatory power. Our
basic model, which looked at the effect of level of educational attainment on median contract
rent exhibited good explanatory power, with an R squared of .63. The model in which we
examined the effect of changes in housing supply, resident tenure, and population had lower
explanatory power than the first model, with an R squared of .43. The third model had the
lowest explanatory power of all four models with an R squared of only .22. This model
examined the effects of specific demographic characteristics on median contract rent. Finally,
our fourth set of specification displayed as high a level of explanatory power as our basic model
but illuminated the possibility of a lag effect. Namely, that younger, better educated residents
could begin their in-migration to an area by occupying the “fringe” or outlying sections of an
area. The arrival of these pioneers to an area will likely raise the level of educational attainment
before having an effect on the median contract rent. The results of Model IV, while having
identical R squared to those of Model I, provide the best support for our hypothesis that
differentially informed (better educated) market participants will recognize the disparity we have
termed the price-value gap in the rental price of apartments. They will migrate towards those
areas to capture this difference and in so doing drive the median contract rent in those areas up
towards equilibrium with those of the higher priced comparator group in the City Center.
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Scatter Plots
Four scatter plots were created, one for each of the sample periods to graphically
represent the correlation between median rent and education level for each census tract. The
intuition is that there should be a progression from the lower left quadrant of the matrix,
indicating the lowest levels of education and rent, upwards and towards to right to indicate
changes in education level and subsequent changes in rent. Further, it is expected that the census
tracts which have the highest level of education among their residents will be those which also
have the highest rents.
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Exhibit 7| SCATTERPLOTS OF MEDIAN RENT BY ED. ATTAINMENT

1980

1990

2000

2010

As can be seen in Exhibit 7, the dispersion of the data does appear to correspond to our
predictions. In the plot for the 1980 data, we observe dense clustering along the left-hand side,
with only about 2% of observations being to the right of the graphic. The data appears to be less
clustered in the 1990 plot; however, there is still significant clustering along the left-hand side of
the plot. We do note many more observations which have moved to the right as compared to the
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1980 census. This trend continues upon viewing the 2000 scatterplot – again we see increased
dispersion among observations, as compared to previous plots and a marked increase in
movement of tracts toward the upper right. In the final scatterplot for the 2010 sample, the
observations display the greatest dispersion along with the most of observations in the upper
right hand quadrant of the graphic. On review of the four plots, we observe that the lower right
quadrant has no observations in any of the graphics. This supports our theoretical expectation
that such a combination (high rent and low education) would be economically improbable, and
by extension provides support to the grouping of observations in the other four quadrants and the
inferences made about them.

Quintile Rankings
All census tracts were ranked per quintiles which ranged in value from 0 (lowest) to 4
(highest). To create the quintile rankings, we ranked each census tract based on the median rent
in each sample (1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010). As there were 572 census tracts, the rankings were
presented in descending order with 572 being the rank for the highest median rent collected in
1980 and 1 being the rank for the tract with the lowest median rent collected in 1980. This
ranking was repeated for the composite education level for each census tract. The composite
education scores were calculated as follows. First, the percentage of individuals in a census tract
with college education and the percentage of individuals with post-graduate education is
calculated. Each tract is then given a score of 0-4 corresponding to the quintile that the tract falls
in based on the percentage of individuals who are college educated. That is, the 20% of census
tracts that have the highest percentage of college educated individuals are given a score of 4.
The next 20% is given a score of 3 and so forth. A similar score is calculated for post-graduate
education. The composite education score is the mean of these two scores and goes from 0-4.
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Census tracts are sorted in descending composite score for 1980.10
The quintile rankings were then used to create tables which showed the greatest
movement in median rent and in composite educational attainment for each of the individual
sample periods and for the entire study period. Exhibit 8 presents the census tracts that had the
largest increase in median rent quintile. In all four sample periods, there was at least one census
tract that moved from the lowest quintile to the highest quintile, representing an increase in four
quintiles.

34

Exhibit 8| Top Median Rent Quintile Movers, 1980-2010
1980-1990
Census Tracts

43, 51, 63, 77,
129.01, 149, 161,
181

1990-2000
Change

4 Quintiles

Census Tracts

555

2000-2010
Change

4 Quintiles

Census Tracts

235, 502.02, 562,
1150

1980-2010
Change

Census Tracts

Change

4 Quintiles

39, 43, 51, 63, 77,
121, 129.01, 133,
137, 141, 143, 145,
147, 149, 161, 181,
191, 201, 203, 205,
464, 477, 495, 497,
501, 503, 513, 519,
555, 557, 565, 569,
589, 591

4 Quintiles

Note: This Exhibit presents the census tracts that had the largest increase in median rent quintile for 1980-1990, 1990-2000, 2000-2010, and 19802010. In all four sample periods there was at least one census tract that went from the lowest quintile to the highest quintile, representing an increase in
four quintiles.
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Exhibit 9 presents the census tracts that had the largest increase in composite education
score for 1980-1990, 1990-2000, 2000-2010, and 1980-2010. While the largest possible increase
would again be a change of 4 quintiles, not every sample period had a census tract which
exhibited that magnitude of change. For example, in 1980-1990, the top moving tracts in this
period had an increase of 3.5 quintiles. Exhibit 10 shows the results in terms of those census
tracts that had the largest increase in both median rent quintile and composite education score for
1980-1990, 1990-2000, 2000-2010, and 1980-2010. The change is calculated by taking the
difference of the sum of the median rent quintile (0-4) and the composite education score (0-4).
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Exhibit 9| Top Composite Education Score Movers, 1980-2010
1980-1990

1990-2000

Census Tracts

Change

51, 141

3.5

Census Tracts
268, 481, 519, 557,
569

2000-2010

1980-2010

Change

Census Tracts

Change

Census Tracts

Change

2.5

101

3

203

4

Note: This Exhibit presents the census tracts that had the largest increase in composite education score for 1980-1990, 1990-2000, 2000-2010, and 19802010. The largest increase in the score is not necessarily the possible maximum increase. For example, in 1980-1990, it could be possible for some tracts
to move from 0 to 4, however no tracts actually showed this change. So the top movers in this time period are the tracts that had an increase of 3.5

Exhibit 10| Top Overall Movers in both Median Rent and Composite Education Rankings, 1980-2010
1980-1990

1990-2000

2000-2010

1980-2010

Census Tracts

Change

Census Tracts

Change

Census Tracts

Change

Census Tracts

Change

51

7.5

519, 555

5.5

235

6

203

8

Note: This Exhibit presents the census tracts that had the largest increase in both median rent quintile and composite education score for 1980-1990,
1990-2000, 2000-2010, and 1980-2010. The change is calculated by taking the difference of the sum of the median rent quintile (0-4) and the
composite education score (0-4).
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Finally, in Exhibit 11, the census tracts with the largest increases in median rent are
presented along with the name of the neighborhood in which they are located, their geographic
proximity to the city center (Manhattan) and whether they have been categorized by the NY
Times as gentrified. Of the 33 census tracts which showed the greatest increase in rent over the
sample period, 32 were both considered proximal to the city center, and were categorized as
having been Gentrified. This Exhibit also contains six of the nine census tracts which were listed
as having shown the greatest gains in level of educational attainment. The three which were not
listed were in areas which were farther away from the City Center and, had experienced
significant growth from residents who emigrated from countries with advanced educational
systems (China, Russia and Israel).
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Exhibit 11| Geographic Distribution of Greatest Increases in Median Rent, 1980-2010
Tract #

Referred to As Gentrified in NY Times

Western Part of Borough

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

77

Yes

Yes

121

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

133

Yes

Yes

137

Yes

Yes

141

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

147

Yes

Yes

149

Yes

Yes

39

Neighborhood
Boerum Hill

43
51
63

129.01

Carroll Gardens

Gowanus

143
145

South Slope

161

Red Hook

Yes

Yes

181

Brooklyn Academy

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

191

Fort Greene

201
203

Prospect Heights

205
464

Borough Park

No

No

477

Yes

Yes

495

Yes

Yes

497

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

513

Yes

Yes

519

Yes

Yes

555

Yes

Yes

557

Yes

Yes

565

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

589

Yes

Yes

591

Yes

Yes

501
503

569

Williamsburg

Greenpoint

This Exhibit presents the census tracts which had the highest increase in median rent for the entire sample
period. It groups the census tracts per the neighborhood in which they are located and identifies whether
the area is a) in the western part of the county, placing it more proximally to the City Center (Manhattan)
and b) whether the area had been referred to by the NY Times as being Gentrified
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examined the effects of geographic proximity to City Center, and level
of educational attainment as being determinants of gentrification for specific census tracts in
Kings County (Brooklyn), NY. We theorized that gentrification was driven, in part, by a market
microstructure effect known as informational cascades. In these cascades, members of groups
rely on peers’ prior actions as their guide to make decisions regarding investment, housing
choice and other important activities. As members of these groups identify a discrepancy
between the price/value of living space (given its proximity to the City Center), they
communicate that information to their peers and create a demand shock which causes significant
upward pressure on rental prices. Our results showed that these changes can be dramatic.
Further, we were able to identify that those census tracts which had experienced the greatest
growth in median rents were almost entirely (32/33, or 97%) located in areas that were a)
proximal to the City Center and b) identified as “Gentrified” by the New York Times. These
results would appear to support our contention that gentrification can be understood as an
adjustment to the microstructure of the local market for rental housing driven by the
informational dynamics of the changing demographics of incoming residents. Future research
will be focused on further exploring this dynamic.
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ENDNOTES

1

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) – Supreme Court Justice Stewart made the now famous

quote regarding content of a film.

2

While Brooklyn has enjoyed a long and storied place in American society, the oft-cited, but

never verified “statistic” that 1 in 4 to 1 in 7 Americans can trace their heritage through Brooklyn
has been the source of much debate. Whatever the fundamental value of this statistic is, it is
worth conceding that Brooklyn played a large role in the population of New York City and our
nation.

3

Examples of this can be found in Brooklyn, NY “brownstone” homes, and London,

“Edwardian” homes.

4

Smith (1987) is a commentary on the work of Ley (1986) examination of alternative

explanations for gentrification. Though brief (5 pages) it is an excellent description of rent gap
theory, the main economic theory of gentrification.

5

Barton’s 2014 paper directly examines the importance of the strategy used in “finding”

gentrification. The introduction to his paper has an excellent exploration of historic findings and
methods and served as a model for the current paper.

6

We do note that many researchers prefer to use the Educational Attainment, Age 25 and over,

as this is assumed to be the time at which most individuals have completed their education. This
is echoed by the US Census Bureau. However, in this paper, we chose the earlier age. Our
44

choice was based on wanting to capture the recent University Grads and others who are often
very likely to a) rely on informal informational networks, b) follow the behavior of others within
their network and c) have the strongest financial incentive to locate lower priced housing.

7

Real estate researchers have used panel data methods. For example, see Gao and Wang (2007).

8

This section draws heavily from Frees (2004) Longitudinal and Panel Data for the Social

Sciences. Readers are directed to this work for a comprehensive and clearly articulated
treatment of these methods and their application.

9

The Parks method and DaSilva methods are also useful when there are important unobserved

unit-level variables. These methods rely on autocorrelation of the error term or a moving
average model of the residual effect. Because the data under consideration are at 10-year
intervals, these methods are likely less applicable than circumstances when very high-frequency
panel data is available.
10

Ranking tables were not included in this paper and are available upon request.
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Chapter 2
Information Theoretic Measures Use in Evaluating Property Tax Assessment Models

Abstract
Academics and practitioners have been exploring the concept of vertical inequity in property
taxation for nearly five decades. However, there has yet to be an established standard of how to
measure this phenomenon. Historically, tests of vertical inequity relied on linear regression
models and methods. Unfortunately, no interpretive standard exists to compare results obtained
from different models. In this paper, we apply information theoretic methods to evaluate
models of vertical inequity currently in use. This approach provides an objective framework in
which to view model performance, and has potential application for numerous asset classes and
markets beyond the current study.
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Introduction
It has been over four and a half decades since the seminal work of Paglin and Fogarty
(1972) in which they first present the term “administrative vertical inequity”. As defined in that
work, administrative vertical inequity, is a systematic price related difference between assessed
values and market values (Paglin and Fogarty 1972, 558).
Vertical inequity can be further classified as regressive or progressive. In the case of
regressive vertical inequity, lower priced properties are over-appraised relative to their market
values. Conversely, progressive vertical inequity describes the situation when higher priced
properties are over-appraised relative to their market values. In their work, Paglin and Fogarty
propose that the simple ratio measures in use at that time to detect inequity were sub-optimal to
methods based on linear regression. Their paper set the stage for a thread of inquiry into the
measurement of vertical inequity in property taxation that continues to this day. That inquiry
has produced numerous articles which compare the measures of vertical inequity. Sirmans,
Diskin, and Friday (1995) provides an excellent review of many of these early measures.
Several years later, Decesare and Ruddock (1998) extends the review of measures and the
consideration of the underlying problem internationally. Additional reviews were compiled in
later years by Sirmans, Gatzlaff and MacPherson (2008) and Birch and Sunderman (2014).
Practitioners have also contributed meaningfully to the debate with articles by Gloudemans
(2011), Denne (2011) and Carter (2016). While there is a healthy debate regarding the merits of
different measures and approaches, academics and practitioners do agree that there is no
consensus regarding which measure is most appropriate.
Around the same time as the initial examination of vertical inequity, important
developments were taking place in the field of Information theory. In 1974, Akaike (1974)
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published his ground-breaking paper on model comparison using an information criterion. Using
an information theoretic approach, Akaike devises a measure to quantify the degree of
information lost when using a specific model as compared to other models. Akaike simply
named this measure an information criterion, though it has come to be known as the Akaike
Information Criterion, or AIC. Akaike based the information criterion on the properties of
another measure, the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. Both measure the information loss by
comparing the distributions of two models. In this paper, we use KL Divergence to evaluate the
most widely used measures of vertical inequity.
The economic impact of this subject is significant. According to the US Census
Quarterly Summary of State and Local Tax Revenue, FY 2016 total state and local property tax
revenue exceeded $540B
(https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/econ/qtax/historical.Q4.html). These tax revenues
provide the majority of operating funds for local jurisdictions and municipalities. Given their
economic significance, the accuracy of assessing these liabilities is of great importance to a
variety of stakeholders. These include citizens/property owners, assessors, program
administrators, policy makers, real estate professionals, attorneys and others. Finally, to the best
of the author’s understanding, the current paper is the first to apply information theoretic
methods to the analysis of property tax data.
The current paper classifies the most often reviewed measures of vertical inequity in
property taxation as either linear or instrumental variable / proxy models. We consider how the
latter group were designed to address the major weakness of the linear models, i.e., suffering
from the errors in variables (EIV) problem. Further, we show that later models were aimed at
addressing the EIV problem, but that they also suffered from an omitted variable bias. Finally,
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we consider “proxy” models, which create unique measures based on underlying changes in the
assessment and sales data.
Our sample includes data from the 2013 Certified Assessment Roll of Shelby County,
Tennessee. The dataset contains 3,561 observations across 7 tax districts, 6 municipalities and
133 neighborhoods. The main city in Shelby County is Memphis, TN. Our findings could
appropriately be extrapolated to other locales in the United States given the variations in housing
type, age, and value in our sample geography. Further, the population in those sample
geographies shows broad variation in diversity, income, and other important demographic
characteristics.
Having completed the Introduction, the paper continues with the Literature Review and
Background sub-sections. The next section describes of the Data and Methods used and is
followed by a discussion of the Results. The final section is the Conclusion.

Literature Review
Vertical Inequity: Historic Context and Description of Measures
The term “administrative vertical equity” was first presented in the work of Paglin and
Fogarty (1972). They offered the label to describe the phenomenon of systematic differences in
the assessed value / sales value ratio (A/S ratio) for a given class of property in the assessment of
property values.

In this section we will discuss three classes of measures of vertical inequity in

property tax ratios: measures of dispersion/general models, linear models, and then finally P
The general measures do not provide data regarding vertical inequity. They are basic
measures of dispersion, or descriptive statistics. These measures are presented in the
publications of the International Association of Assessment Officers (IAAO). The IAAO is a
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professional membership organization, founded in 1934, for government assessment officials and
those in the business and academic communities with interest in the theory and practice of
property tax assessment. The IAAO publishes educational materials for property tax assessors
and other related parties. These include textbooks such as Property Appraisal and Assessment
Administration (IAAO 1990) and technical standards. The technical standards are guidelines on
assessment techniques and administration for practitioners and other stakeholders. In this paper,
we will refer frequently to the Standard on Ratio Studies (Standard). The 2013 Standard defines
the first of these general measures, Coefficient of Dispersion (COD) as “the most generally
useful measure of variability or uniformity” in that it “measures the average percentage
deviation of the ratios from the median ratio” (IAAO 2013, 13). In comparison, the Coefficient
of Variation (COV) describes the deviation from the mean. Both measures merely give us a
sense of the spread of the data and do not provide a measure of vertical inequity. The final
general measure is the Price Related Differential (PRD). It divides the mean ratio by the
weighted mean ratio. It is referred to in the Standard as an “index statistic” (IAAO 2013, 13)
which can indicate vertical inequity. The assumption of no vertical inequity would be a PRD
result of unity, or 1. The Standard does caution that with samples which are smaller or have
extreme outliers, “the PRD may not be a sufficiently reliable measure of vertical inequities”
(IAAO 2013, 13). It also notes that if the PRD result does indicate vertical inequity. In addition,
more powerful statistical tests for vertical inequities are available and should be employed to
determine the significance of the indication provided by the PRD (IAAO 2013, 13).
Looking at linear measures, the Paglin and Fogarty (1972) model is regarded as the first
vertical inequity model. The authors argued that simple ratio measures were insufficient to
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accurately measure vertical inequity and instead proposed a linear regression model. Their
formula is
𝐴𝑉 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 𝑆𝑃 + 𝜀𝑖

(1)

or assessed value is equal to the sum of three terms: the intercept 𝑎0 , the product of the linear
coefficient 𝑎1 , and the sales price and the error term. The variable of interest is the slope term
𝑎1. When 𝑎1 = 1, there is no vertical inequity. If 𝑎1 < 1 then vertical inequity is present and is
classified as progressive. In the opposite instance, if 𝑎1 > 1 then vertical inequity is present and
is classified as regressive.
In 1974, Cheng (1974) introduces a model, which is similar to the Paglin and Fogarty
model, but with a log-log transformation. Cheng applied this change to address what he believed
to be the non-linear nature of the AV and SP relationship. In applying the log-log transform,
Cheng is calculating the elasticity of the relationship between AV and SP, as represented by the
𝛽1 coefficient. The variable of interest in their model is 𝛽1. If 𝛽1 = 1, there is no vertical
inequity.
ln(𝐴𝑉𝑖 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ ln(𝑆𝑃𝑖 ) + 𝜀𝑖

(2)

In 1978, the IAAO (1978) enter the discussion, by arguing that the assessment ratio
(𝑖. 𝑒.,

𝐴𝑉
𝑆𝑃

) is the more appropriate measure to use, thereby yielding the expression
𝐴𝑉𝑖
𝑆𝑃𝑖

= 𝛽0 + (𝛽1 𝑆𝑃𝑖 ) + 𝜀𝑖

This innovation was the use of the sale ratio as the left-hand side variable in the regression
model. The interpretation of results is based on the value for the 𝐵1 coefficient, where a
coefficient of 0 indicates no inequity, while a positive coefficient (> 1) indicates progressive
inequity and a negative coefficient (< 1) indicates regressive inequity.
The Kochin and Parks model (1982) is essentially the Cheng model with the sale price
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(3)

now serving as the dependent variable and the assessed value now as an independent variable.
They contend earlier models are mis-specified, that is, their method of regressing assessed value
against sales price, should be reversed. The rationale being that SP can be better predicted by
AV, than the opposite (AV being predicted by SP). This would, in their description make AV a
more accurate, and more valid predictor of the unknown market value variable.
The authors offer this modification as a solution to what they believe to be an error in
variables (EIV) problem with earlier models. As referred to in econometrics, errors in variables,
as the name implies, describes the situation where one or more of the explanatory, or X variables
in a linear regression equation are measured with error (Durbin 1954). In this case, Kochin and
Parks assert that models which use assessed value as the explanatory or y value are biased and
therefore, flawed. Kochin and Parks model is:
ln(𝑆𝑃𝑖 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ ln(𝐴𝑉𝑖 ) + 𝜀𝑖

(4)

with the rationale being that SP can be better predicted by AV than the opposite (AV being
predicted by SP). This would, in their description make AV a more accurate, and more valid
predictor of the unknown market value variable.
Bell (1984) argues that a simple linear model is insufficient to represent the true data
distribution and introduces a quadratic term to address the problem of non-linearity. The Bell
model is:
𝐴𝑉𝑖 = 𝛽0 + (𝛽1 𝑆𝑃𝑖 ) + (𝛽2 𝑆𝑃𝑖2 ) + 𝜀𝑖

(5)

The rationale for his model is that it provides two coefficients to test for the presence of inequity,
and therefore is not limited to the constraints imposed by a strictly linear model. The result is
interpreted first by determining whether the quadratic term is significant. In those cases where
the quadratic term is significant, then its sign will determine progressive (positive) or regressive
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(negative) inequity. If the quadratic term is insignificant, then the linear term (intercept constant)
is considered. If significant, then the sign would indicate regressivity (positive) or progressivity
(negative). In those instances where both the quadratic and intercept term are insignificant, then
no vertical inequity is present.
The final group of three models have been categorized as those that use instrumental
variables or a proxy to detect and measure vertical inequity. We provide brief descriptions here
and direct the reader to consult Appendix A where each model is given a more thorough
treatment. In general, each of these models were developed in response to the errors in variables
problem noted earlier. One of the technical solutions for the error in variables problem is the use
of an Instrumental Variable (IV) (Wooldridge 2003).
Clapp (1990) makes use of simultaneous equations to create a two-stage least squares
model which utilizes an IV, created from the log of both Sales Price and Assessed Value. It is
presumed that the IV will more accurately reflect the “unobservable” market value and thus
address the errors in variables problem.
Birch and Sunderman (2014) recognize the utility of the Clapp model in addressing the
errors in variables problem, however, they raise another important methodological issue, omitted
variable bias (OVB). The authors note that there are significant neighborhood level effects
which, if not accounted for will subject the model to bias. They extend the Clapp model to
recognize neighborhood effects through the use of three equations. The first of which account
for district wide vertical inequity, the next accounts for neighborhood level horizontal inequity,
and the final identifies neighborhood level vertical inequity.
The Coefficient of Price Related Bias (PRB) was created by Gloudemans (2011) in
response to the errors in variables problem found in other models. The PRB is referred to as a
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proxy model because it uses a “property value proxy” which the author says is computed as
“one-half of (time adjusted) sale price plus one-half of appraised value” (Gloudemans 2011, 5).
The PRB is said to measure “the percentage increase (decrease) in assessment ratios relative to
the percentage increase in property values” (Gloudemans 2011, 5).
Carter (2016) notes a number of issues regarding measures of vertical inequity. In his
review, he identifies that: a) most measures of vertical inequity tend to detect it, b) that the
choice of whether the dependent variable is assessed value or sale price will change a finding of
vertical inequity from regressive to progressive, and c) he also recognizes the errors in variables
problem posed by the fact that the market price is non-observable. Carter ends his review by
advising that in the absence of a clear objective standard, assessment professionals are most
prudent if they use multiple measures to determine vertical inequity (Carter 2016).

Information Theory: Conceptual Background
This section is based on Golan’s comprehensive review and discussion of Information
Theory (IT) and Information Entropy Econometrics (IEE) (Golan 2008). Readers are strongly
encouraged to consult this for a detailed and informative exploration of these topics.
Learning or, more formally, “research” can be generically described as a process of using
limited knowledge and observations from which larger “truth” is then inferred. The researcher
observes a process and records the outcomes, i.e., gathers data. The researcher uses this data to
construct a symbolic representation of their understanding of the data generating process (DGP),
i.e., a model. The model does not depict the entire or “true” state of the DGP, any more than a
map provides a complete and true depiction of the territory. The model is incomplete as it is: a)
based on limited observation and b) influenced by the researcher’s interpretation of those
observations. To put it more plainly, if the researcher had complete understanding of the data
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generating process, a model would be unnecessary. Box summarizes this in his well-known
observation: “The most that can be expected from any model is that it can supply a useful
approximation to reality: All models are wrong; some models are useful.” (Box, Hunter and
Hunter 2005, 440). The idea of model utility is fundamental to both Information Theory and the
current paper. A “useful” model enables the researcher to recover information about, or, to
estimate a probability distribution for the data generating process. Accordingly, we can make the
following assertion - a “useful model” enables the recovery of information regarding
characteristics of the DGP, specifically its probability distribution.
Regarding model development, the aphorism “let the data drive the process” is repeated
in universities around the world. It is an admonishment to researchers that they are best served
by limiting/excluding any a priori beliefs or assumptions regarding the data. While accepted as
“common sense” there is an important methodological rationale supporting this admonition; it is
referred to as underdetermination and can be explained by the following description:
Stated in its most general sense, the goal of the researcher (any researcher) is to
understand the “true state of the world” regarding some specific phenomenon. However, in the
vast majority of instances, the researcher does not have all available information regarding the
phenomenon. In fact, typically the data the researcher has is incomplete and “noisy”; it contains
information with no power to explain the phenomenon of interest. It also contains information
which does have explanatory power relative to the phenomenon, or “signal”. As stated, the
researcher often does not have the full set of data, only a smaller set of observations, i.e. a
sample. Using the sample, the researcher obtains measurements of descriptive characteristics
and calculates statistical moments for the sample. The researcher also knows or may reasonably
presume that the distribution is proper – i.e., the probabilities of all possible outcomes of the

55

phenomenon sum to one.
At this point, with only two pieces of information (sample moments and proper
distribution) regarding the data generating function (DGF) the researcher wishes to construct a
model describing the probability satisfying the observed moments. However, it can be said that
there exist an infinite number of proper probability distributions of the DGF which will satisfy
the observed moments. In other words, the dimensions of the unknown distribution (in this case,
the number of distributions satisfying the observed moments) outnumber the observed moments.
The available evidence does not provide sufficient information from which the “true”
explanation can be recovered, therefore the researcher’s belief regarding the DGP and its
probability distribution is said to be underdetermined given the available data. The
underdetermination problem, and its underlying epistemological considerations, was first
identified by the ancient Greek Skeptics, and then again, by Descartes. In the modern era, it was
articulated and considered by Quine and formalized in the Quine-Duhem thesis. This provides
the reasoning behind the instruction to restrict a priori assumptions. Given the difference in scale
between the known and unknown dimensions of underdetermined problems, a priori assumptions
can impose conditions which are inconsistent with the true representation of the DGF. The
solution, can best be understood by understanding the evolution of a key Information Theoretic
measure. The Shannon Entropy, referred to as Shannon Entropy, and its mathematical
generalization, the Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence.

Information Theory: History and Development of Shannon Entropy and KL
Divergence
Two distinct streams of inquiry led to the development of Information Theory (IT) and
Informational Entropy Econometrics (IEE). This section explores the historic evolution of these
important ideas as described by Jaynes (1979) and the notes from his MIT lectures regarding the
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Maximum Entropy Formalism. Jaynes identifies Bernoulli’s proposal of an idea which he
named, the Principle of Insufficient Reason in his Ars Conjectandi in the early 18th century
(Bernouilli 1713) as the seminal idea in information theory. It would be more easily recognized
by the name given it 200 years later, when Keynes renamed it as the Principle of Indifference
(Keynes 1921). The key ideas underlying the Principle are: a) probability assignments are means
of describing the state of knowledge about a subject and b) in the absence of evidence directing
us to do otherwise, the most rational course of action is to assign equal probabilities to different
propositions or ideas. Jaynes notes that this notion would be advanced when LaPlace in 1774
published his “"Mémoire sur la probabilité des causes par les événemens” or Memoir on Inverse
Probability (LaPlace 1986). LaPlace observed that by knowing something regarding previous
outcomes, it would be possible to adjust our beliefs (or our expectations) regarding the future
outcomes. Jaynes goes on to observe that the classic formula 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) =

𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵)

commonly

referred to as Bayes Rule or Bayes Law was in fact developed by LaPlace and he articulated the
challenge as identifying how to accurately calculate the condition of a system using data which
offered only a limited number of “expectation values”. This group of inquiry would later be
referred to as statistical inference.
In the second group, Jaynes considers the 19th century work of Maxwell and Boltzmann,
who developed the ideas which later came to be referred to as statistical mechanics. Maxwell
was interested in how probability analysis could aid his study of the behavior of gases (Maxwell
1879). Boltzmanns interest was using probability analysis in his work on molecular motion.
Boltzmann discovered that he could use probability to identify and exclude irrelevant
information from consideration, thereby saving him massive amounts of work. This was of
immense value considering that this was taking place long before computers were available and,
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more importantly, that the work would ultimately prove to have been of no value. Boltzmann
referred to this as the method of most probable distribution and it formed the basis of the field of
statistical mechanics (Boltzmann 1871).
Finally, in the 1940’s at Bell labs, Claude Shannon was following on the work of Norbert
Wiener, when he identified and published his groundbreaking paper describing the optimal
method for encoding a message for transmission (Shannon 1948). Interestingly, Wiener’s
original work made the important finding that one could model a signal (information source) as a
random process, or “noise”. However, since Wiener looked at analog (as opposed to digital)
signal sources, his contributions were overshadowed by Shannon. Wiener would make go on to
make another important contribution to finance in his later work regarding Brownian motion, or
the random fluctuation of a fluids velocity. This became a key element used by Black-Scholes
(and Merton) in their Nobel Prize winning model for option pricing (Nobel.org 1997).
Shannon’s entropy was based on the theory of thermodynamic entropy used in physics,
and has been interpreted in numerous, sometimes inaccurate ways over the years. The Free
Dictionary provides an elegant definition: “In information theory, a mathematical measure of the
degree of randomness in a set of data, with greater randomness implying higher entropy and
greater predictability implying lower entropy. Also called Shannon entropy.” Shannon
expressed his entropy mathematically as
𝐻(𝑋) = − ∑𝑁
𝑖=0 𝑃(𝑋𝑖) 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝑃(𝑋𝑖)
Where H is the Shannon Entropy
X is an event, also understood as the occurrence of a random variable
P(xi) is the probability of variable/event x
log2 is the base 2 logarithm
Conceptually, the Shannon Entropy can be understood as the probability weighted mean of
information from a random data source. Alternatively, the Shannon entropy of a probability
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(6)

distribution could be defined as the expected value of the information of said probability
distribution.
This relationship of probability of an event and the information provided on observing
the event is, on further consideration, intuitive. For example, consider the following generalized
form
0 ≤ 𝐻(𝑝) ≥ log (n)

(7)

The simplest practical demonstration of this would a coin flip. It is well understood that the
probability of a fair coin is equal to ½, as there are two equally probable outcomes of a single
flip, heads or tails. Suppose now that the coin has been changed to a “two headed” coin. What
is the probability of getting “heads” on the next (or any) toss? It is 1 and the probability of
getting “tails” on the next (or any) toss is 0. This defines the lower bound of the above statement
– When the probability of a single variable = 1, and all other variables have 0 probability of
occurrence, then H(p) = 0. Again, this is intuitive, no new information is provided by each
successive toss, we know the result will “always” be heads. Now, defining the upper bound of
the above statement. In the case of a fair coin, the probability of all variables (heads, tails) are
equivalent. Therefore, we can describe the upper bound as When all variables are equiprobable,
then H(p)=log(n), where log is the logarithm of the number of possible outcomes, n.
The next important step is the development of the Kullback-Leibler Divergence. The
authors described their measure as an attempt to generalize Shannon’s definition of information.
They also observe that Weiner had essentially the same definition of information (Kullback and
Leibler 1951).
𝑄(𝑖)

𝐷𝐾𝐿 (𝑃||𝑄) = − ∑𝑖 𝑃 (𝑖) log 𝑃(𝑖)
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(8)

𝑞

Note – the formula uses the log property log 𝑞 − log 𝑝 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝 to show difference operation. In
this discrete case, the DKL is described as follows – There exists a function 𝑔(𝑦) with a
probability distribution function (pdf). This pdf is encoded in bits and is referenced as 𝑝. This is
the true model probability density function. Likewise, there exists a function, 𝑓(𝑦), also with a
probability distribution function encoded in bits and referenced as 𝑞. This is the candidate model
probability density function. Finally, imagine attempting to describe 𝑔(𝑦) the true distribution
using 𝑞, the coding for 𝑓(𝑦), the candidate distribution, understanding that 𝑓(𝑦) ≠ 𝑔(𝑦). The
DKL calculates the additional bits required to do that and is a measure of the inefficiency of using
the candidate distribution encoding to describe the true distribution (Burnham and Anderson
2004) This divergence is referred to as the information loss. The DKL is also called the relative
entropy and intuitively, we can see how minimizing the DKL would maximize the entropy.
This is directly relevant to the work of Jaynes, who, in the mid-20th century, combined
the theoretical/philosophical understandings of the first group with the quantitative tools of the
second and referred to the new understanding as the Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt) formalism
(Jaynes 1979). Stated simply, it argues that the most appropriate distribution is one which
reflects the known information but is “noncommittal” as to missing information and selects the
distribution of greatest uncertainty, aka the highest entropy.
Around the same time, Lindley’s seminal paper was published in which he identified that
an experiment and the information it provided could be modeled as a signal receiver process,
similar to Shannon (Lindley 1956). In Lindley’s model a statistical sample is analogous to a
noisy communication channel. The underlying ideas of minimal a priori assumptions regarding
the distribution, and identifying both signal and noise would develop into the field known as
information theory.
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Data and Methods
Data were gathered from the 2013 Certified Assessment Roll for Shelby County, TN.
The data were single parcel, residential sales transactions conveyed “at arm’s length” via
warranty deed from June through December of 2012. In the first step of the analysis, we
construct the same sample as Birch, Sunderman and Radetskiy (2017) hereinafter referred to as
BSR used in their analysis and identify 3,561 individual transactions distributed across 133
neighborhoods in our sample geography. Following the procedures used in BSR, we include the
A/S (assessment/ sales) ratio observations in the 2nd through 99th percentiles in our sample
construction, as the top and bottom 1% of observations were removed during sample
construction. Also, neighborhoods with nine or fewer sales were removed from the analysis
either because they could not be analyzed for lack of observations or because they had no
statistically significant neighborhood inequity. Given previous concerns regarding heterogeneity
effect on the accuracy of these measures (Jensen 2009), it is likely that eliminating this segment
of the observations will reduce any outliers which have disproportionate influence on the results.
BSR used the Coefficient of Dispersion (COD), Coefficient of Variation (COV), Price
Related Differential (PRD) and Price Related Bias (PRB), Clapp (1990), and Birch and
Sunderman (2014) measures in their analyses and we include those also in our analysis. We also
conduct the market-based adjustments described in BSR. Finally, we extend their analytic
approach by including the following five additional measures: Paglin and Fogarty (1972),
Kochin and Parks (1982), Bell (1984), Cheng (1974), and IAAO (1978).
We then apply an information criterion to analyze the results generated by these analyses
through our use of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence measure. As noted earlier, KL
Divergence measures the extent by which an observed probability distribution diverges from an
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expected probability distribution.
𝑃(𝑖)

𝐷𝐾𝐿 (𝑃||𝑄) = − ∑𝑖 𝑃 (𝑖) log 𝑄(𝑖)

(9)

In our approach, the probability distribution generated by the various measures of vertical
inequity as our observed probability is represented as 𝑝 and the distribution of the “true” (perfect
equity) distribution is represented as 𝑞. The resultant divergence measure quantifies the
information loss when comparing the observed distribution generated by the vertical inequity
measure (𝑝) against the true distribution (𝑞). The resulting measure is one of divergence and not
distance as the measure is not symmetrical i.e., 𝐷𝐾𝐿 (𝑝||𝑞) ≠ 𝐷𝐾𝐿 (𝑞||𝑝) . For this reason,
Kullback preferred to describe the results as discrimination information (Kullback 1987). The
intuition behind the interpretation of results can be simply described as follows; The results of
the KL Divergence are non-negative and range from 0-1. In those cases where 𝐷𝐾𝐿 = 0 we could
say that there is no difference in the expectation of the two distributions, and by extension, the
function which generated them. Conversely, in those cases where 𝐷𝐾𝐿 = 1 we would say that
there is a sufficiently large difference in the two distributions as to have no reasonable
expectation of one having observed the other.
Our method for using the KL Divergence is straightforward; We apply each of the
measures of vertical inequity to the sample and generate a probability distribution. This
observed distribution is then compared to the “true” distribution and the 𝐷𝐾𝐿 result is generated.
We can quantify the information loss for each of the individual measure of vertical inequity.
Further, we can then compare the respective information loss of each measure to the other
measures.

Results
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Table 1 presents summary data for the complete sample. There are 3,561 observations
distributed across 133 neighborhoods. The observed moments in our current analysis are
distributed identically as those in the BSR paper. We further note that the descriptive statistics
presented in Table 1 are for the observations in the 2nd through 99th percentile ranks as the top
and bottom 1% of observations were removed during sample construction.

TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
Sales Price and Assessed Value, Shelby County, TN June - December 2012

Mean
Median
Min
Max.
Std. Dev

Sales Price

Assessed Value

A/S Ratio

199,234
163,000
11,500
2,030,000
151,322

200,663
163,200
18,300
2,030,000
148,621

1.045
1.000
0.744
2.978
0.208

Notes: This table presents the summary statistics for the sample data. The data was
drawn from the2013 Certified Assessment Roll for Shelby County, TN.
There were
3,561 individual sales in 133 neighborhoods in sample geography.

Table 2 presents the results of the three equations used in creating the neighborhood
adjusted Birch-Sunderman model. Equation 2 is the Clapp measure, and there is a finding of
vertical inequity as the coefficient of 1.067 > 1. In the case of equation (3), the district vertical
inequity is adjusted to account for horizontal inequity effects at the neighborhood level. The
slope coefficient 0.738 is smaller than the district wide result found in equation (2). Further, as
the result < 1, the finding suggests that the vertical inequity is progressive. Finally, equation (4)
accounts for both horizontal and vertical inequity neighborhood level effects and produces a
slope coefficient of 0.346. Again, as the observed slope coefficient < 1, this result is interpreted
as indicating the presence of progressive vertical inequity. The disagreement between equation
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(2) Clapp – District Wide and equations (3) and (4) Birch-Sunderman with neighborhood
indicator variables is explained by BSR as providing evidence of significant neighborhood
horizontal and vertical inequity neighborhood effects which, due to omitted variable bias, were
not captured by the Clapp district wide model (equation 2). Birch-Sunderman in their 2014
article detail statistical procedures how to determine which equation should be used in a given
jurisdiction. If there is found to be no horizontal or vertical inequity at the neighborhood level,
then equation 2, in essence the Clapp procedure, is the appropriate approach. If there is
horizontal inequity at the neighborhood level, but no vertical inequity, then equation 3 is
warranted. However, if there is both horizontal and vertical inequity at the neighborhood level,
as there was in this particular jurisdiction, then equation 4 should be used.

Table 2 District Vertical Inequity Estimators
Equation

Estimator

t-statistica

Equation 2

1.067

7.09b

Equation 3

0.738

-18.69b

Equation 4

0.346

-43.40b

Notes:
a - Based on null hypothesis that true district vertical inequity
coeffient = 1.0 (neutral property taxes).
b - Statistical significance at 0.01 level

In the next step, we expand our analysis and evaluate our sample data with eight
measures which have been widely cited in the literature on vertical equity in property taxation.
The initial two measures are described in the IAAO Standards on Ratio Studies (“Standards”)
(IAAO 2013). This publication is produced by the IAAO and provides guidance and explanation
on the analysis of data of properties assessed values vs. market price. They are the Coefficient of
Dispersion (COD) and the Coefficient of Variation (COV). Described as measures of variability,
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these are general measures of uniformity of the data and as noted in the Standards measure
“horizontal, or random, dispersion among the ratios in a stratum, regardless of the value of
individual parcels” (IAAO 2013, 14).
We then evaluate measures of vertical inequity, dividing them among three classes based
on the model or regression specification used: Linear, Proxy, and Instrumental Variable models.
We consider five linear models: Price Related Differential (PRD); and the Paglin and Fogarty
(1972), Kochin and Parks (1982), Cheng (1974), and Bell (1984) models. We then consider two
proxy models, the IAAO (1978) measure and Coefficient of Price Related Bias (Gloudemans
2011). Finally, we consider two models which employ an Instrumental Variable approach, the
Clapp (1990) and Birch and Sunderman (2014) model.
In Table 3, we note the following results. Regarding our measures of dispersion, the COD
is reported as 9.43%. The IAAO Standards present interpretive guidance on COD and suggest
that COD < 10% are considered acceptable, and that properties which vary in age and
environment can have COD values of as high as 20% (IAAO 2013, 17). The COV is reported as
19.88%. This is to be expected as the COV uses the mean, as opposed to the median used in the
COD, and will therefore be more sensitive to influential observations (outliers) at either end of
the range.
In considering the measures of vertical inequity, we note that the IAAO Standards define
these inequities as “systematic differences in the appraisal of low- and high-value properties,
termed “vertical” inequities” (IAAO 2013, 29).

In our initial class, the linear models of

vertical inequity we obtain the following results.
The Price Related Differential (PRD) is described as an index statistic which is calculated
by dividing the mean ratio by the weighted mean ratio. Our results PRD = 1.038 indicate that

65

vertical inequity is detected and that it is regressive. It should be noted that the PRD can be
distorted in instances where there are smaller sample sizes or where samples contain influential
outlier observations (Carter 2016). The Paglin and Fogarty model returned a result of .974
indicating that regressive vertical inequity was present. The results of the Kochin and Park
model found vertical inequity; however, the results of this test would be interpreted as showing
progressive vertical inequity. The final two linear models, the Cheng and the Bell model, both
indicate regressive vertical inequity with results of .908 and .974 respectively.
The next class are the proxy models, which contain two measures. The first is the IAAO
model. We classify this as a proxy model as it was the first model to use the sales ratio as the
dependent variable in the regression model. Previous measures had all used a single variable –
either the assessed value or the sales price as the dependent variable. The IAAO model was the
only one which did not detect vertical inequity. The result reported, 3.28e-07, is infinitesimal (0.000000328), and is therefore reported as 0. The PRB is noted as having an initial value of 0.067. Given that the authors of this measure established a threshold of .05, this result indicates
the presence of regressive vertical inequity.
Finally, the Instrumental Variable models, Clapp and Birch-Sunderman, both detected
vertical inequity. The Clapp model result of 1.067 being indicative of regressive vertical
inequity, while the Birch-Sunderman result of .346 being indicative of progressive vertical
inequity. In summary, all models except one reported vertical inequity, with two of the nine
reporting progressive vertical inequity and the remainder classifying it as regressive.
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Table 3
Vertical Inequity Measures and Interpretation
Measure

Key Result

Measures of Dispersion / General Measures
COD
9.426
COV
19.881
IAAO
Linear Models
PRD
1.038
Paglin and Fogarty
0.974
Kochin and Parks
1.049
Cheng
0.908
Bell

0.974

Vertical Inequity
Detected

Type

Notes

N/A
N/A
No

N/A
N/A
-

Result coefficient was infintessimal -3.28e-07

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Regressive
Regressive
Progressive
Regressive

Yes

Regressive

Instrumental Variable and Proxy Measure
PRB
-0.067
Yes
Regressive
Clapp
1.067
Yes
Regressive
Birch Sunderman
0.346
Yes
Progressive
NOTE:
Tests of Vertical Inequity are divided into two classes - Linear Models, and Instrumental Variable and Proxy Measure Models

While each of the measures provide information, users of that information whether
academics or practitioners face a significant challenge. The different measures return scores
which do not lend themselves to clear interpretation. Further, to date, there has not been a means
by which results obtained from different measures can be compared to one another.
Information theory uses the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to compare models.
However, the AIC is inappropriate in this case, as it requires that the response variable (the y or
LHS variable) is the same for all versions of the model. To overcome this problem, we propose
an alternative approach, which uses the measure on which the AIC is based, the Kullback-Leibler
Divergence (KLDIV) to make important observations regarding each model’s results and then use
those results as the basis of a quantitative comparison of those measures. As described earlier,
the KLDIV describes the extent to which a probability distribution function created from a model,
or data generating function is similar to a target (or true) distribution. In Table 4, we have
calculated the KLDIV for the probability distribution created by each of the measures and
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compared it against the true distribution. In this case, the true distribution is represented by the
perfect equity line of Assessed Value against Sale Value, which is used to determine whether a
set of data from a given jurisdiction displays vertical inequity. While often casually referred to
as KL distance, the divergence is not a true distance measure. It is non-symmetric and does not
satisfy the triangle inequality. It is more appropriately thought of as a measure of similarity.
However, for ease of presentation and interpretation, we will draw an analogy to differences in
distance to help illustrate the results of Table 4. In that table, we have a column with the name
of the measure, the raw KLDIV and a scaled KLDIV “score”. The scaling was performed using this
equation –
Scaled KLDIV Score = 𝐾𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑉 ∗ 105

(10)

We have grouped our models into two classes – the instrumental variable and proxy
models and the linear models. In this instance, the order of presentation is important. As noted
in prior comparisons of these measures, the linear models are considered to face challenges due
to the errors in variables problem discussed earlier and that the Clapp model was identified as
superior to the linear models (Sirmans, Diskin and Friday 1995).

Accordingly, the first group

of models tested are the instrumental variable and proxy models.
It is in interpreting the results that we now apply the analogy of distance to our scaled
results – assume that the scaled results represent distance in feet from a specific location.
Looking at our first class of models, the instrumental variable and proxy models, we see that the
model with the smallest KLDIV is the Birch-Sunderman with a distance of less than 5 yards from
the target point. Next, would be the Clapp model which would be approximately 12 yards from
the target point. There then appears to be a discontinuity as the IAAO model result is analogous
to a distance of 440 yards, roughly a quarter mile from the target. This is interesting given the
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infinitesimal vertical inequity result of this measure. One could interpret these findings as
evidence that the model has a less sensitive threshold to detect vertical inequity, as compared to
other measures. Finally, the PRB model result shows the greatest divergence between its
generated probability distribution and that of the true/target model. This result is the greatest
both for this class and for all models evaluated. At a scaled KLDIV score of 332.185, the
analogous distance would be approximately 62 miles from the target.
Turning to the next class of models, the linear models, it is important to acknowledge that
previous analyses have found these models to suffer from significant methodological issues, thus
providing the rationale to consider them separately from the previous class. Within this class,
the model with the lowest KLDIV scores are the Cheng and Kochin/Parks models. It is interesting
to note that while these two models have the same form and simply “swap” their response
variables – we do not obtain identical outcomes. Alternatively, at what would roughly be 160
yards from the target we have the Paglin and Fogarty and the Bell measure which produce an
identical distance. Recall that in Table 3, these models produced identical coefficients in their
analysis of vertical inequity. This is understandable as the equation for the Bell model is simply
the Paglin and Fogarty model with the quadratic SP term added as a final term.
In summary, after using our models to analyze our sample data set, we then divided the
models into two classes: Instrumental Variable/Proxy and Linear models. The division was
based on the structure of the regression model used, and on prior research findings which
identified that the linear models were likely to provide biased estimates as they are subject to the
errors in variables problem (Sirmans, Diskin and Friday 1995 and Denne 2011). These reviews
identified the Clapp model’s use of an instrumental variable as the remedy for this deficiency in
the linear models. In later work, other models were presented as alternatives to the Clapp
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model. The Birch- Sunderman model addresses the issue of Omitted Variable Bias in the Clapp
model through the inclusion of a neighborhood level variable. The Coefficient of Price Related
Bias (PRB) is presented as a successor to previous “flawed” methods of assessment (Denne
2011). We then calculated the Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLDIV) to measure the extent
which the probability distributions generated by each of the models diverged from that of the
target/true distribution. Our results showed that instrumental variables which include
neighborhood level variables diverge the least from the target distribution. Further, our approach
presents a means by which assessment professionals can identify measures which are most useful
to them and avoid the necessity of using multiple measures as suggested in Carter (Carter 2016).

Table 4
Kullback-Leibler Divergence for Vertical Inequity Measures
Measure

KL Divergence - Raw

KL Divergence - Scaled Score

0.000108492
0.000368311
0.013223210
3.321848000

10.849
36.831
1322.321
332184.800

0.000070976
0.000084327
0.004816136
0.004816136

7.098
8.433
481.614
481.614

Instrumental Variable and Proxy Models
Birch-Sunderman
Clapp
IAAO
PRB
Linear Models
Cheng
Kochin and Parks
Paglin and Fogarty
Bell

NOTE: KL Divergence Scaled Score = KL Divergence Raw * 105
Measures of Dispersion (COD and COV) not included as they are not true measures of vertical inequity

Conclusion
Vertical inequity in property taxation has been the subject of academic and practitioner
debate for over 40 years. During that time, numerous papers have proposed new measures for
the detection of vertical inequity. A significant challenge for practitioners has been the lack of a
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clearly identified measure which would supersede all others. The challenges facing the
profession when it comes to the measurement of vertical inequity were astutely and clearly
articulated by Carter who wrote; “The assessment profession must, in the near future, come to
some semblance of agreement about (1) which measure of vertical equity is best, (2) the
standards for determining whether vertical inequity exists for each measure, and (3) whether it
can develop a new measure that does not have the shortcomings of current measures of vertical
inequity” (Carter 2016, 7). While we would not claim to have definitive answers to those
question, in the current paper we hope to at least provide useful information which can advance
the body of knowledge and assist practitioners in serving their communities.
We approach this task by proposing a novel method for the evaluation of measures of
vertical inequity, the Kullback-Leibler divergence. This measure, taken from the field of
Information theory and largely used in machine learning and artificial intelligence allows for the
comparison of disparate measures being used to evaluate the same phenomena. It produces a
measure which can provide a quantitative (and objective) measure of the extent to which the
probability distributions generated by proposed measures of vertical inequity, differ (or more
precisely diverge) from the true distribution (i.e., one in which there is no vertical inequity exists
for the sample data).
Our results provide a way to rank the accuracy of current measures in correctly
identifying the distribution of assessment data. This may prove useful in addressing the issue of
establishing conditions and thresholds for the detection of vertical inequity. Finally, it will also
provide another tool by which academics and practitioners can test the accuracy of current
measures and the utility of proposed interventions designed to address vertical inequity.
In conclusion, the dialogue between practitioners and academics which has characterized
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this inquiry to date is encouraging and productive. Ongoing debate and critical examination will
lead to careful vetting and continuous improvement of both measures and methods.
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Appendix A: Technical Descriptions
In this section, we review the three models classified as using instrumental variables or a
proxy to detect and measure vertical inequity. As often as is practical, we use the authors exact
language, formulae or graphics in our descriptions.
As noted, these models were developed to address specific econometric challenges. The
first is the errors in variables (EIV) problem, which describes the situation where one or more of
the explanatory, or X variables in a linear regression equation are measured with error (Durbin,
1954). In vertical inequity measurement, the EIV problem arises because the concept of “market
value” is unobservable, and therefore leads to the EIV problem. One of the technical solutions
for the error in variables problem is the use of an Instrumental Variable (IV) (Wooldridge 2003).
The Clapp (1990) model was designed to deal with the EIV problem. In this model, the
author uses a two-stage simultaneous equations method which uses an IV to measure vertical
inequity.
𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑃 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑉
𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑉 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑍
In the first step, Clapp addresses the EIV issue by constructing the IV, referred to as the
zeta term (Z), in the following equation
ln 𝐴𝑉 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑍
As noted, earlier measures of vertical inequity were subject to the charge, that the
“market value” is unobservable. Clapp uses the individual properties ranking on two attributes
which can both be said to represent market value – sale price and assessed value. To calculate
the zeta term, each property is ranked by its AV and SP.

73

1 𝑖𝑓 𝐴𝑉 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑃 ≥ .66
0 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑍={
−1 𝑖𝑓 𝐴𝑉 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑃 ≤ .33
As noted in the expression – when both AV and SP are in the upper 1/3, z =1, and when
AV and SP are both in the lower 1/3, then z = -1. In all other cases (mid-range values for both,
or disagreement AV high and SP low or vice versa) z = 0. Clapp uses the agreement between
AV and SP as evidence of the market value of a property. In the case of the 1/3 of properties that
are in the mid-range of those attributes, or where there is disagreement, the z=0 term essentially
removes those observations from the model.
Once the zeta IV is calculated, the 𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑉 term (which Birch and Sunderman refer to as
𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑉 ∗ ) is then replaced in what Birch and Sunderman (2014) refer to as Equation (2)
𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑃 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑉 ∗
The results of this equation provide the district wide level of vertical inequity based on
the value of 𝑎1 and can be interpreted as;
< 1 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑎1 = { 1 𝑁𝑜 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
> 1 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
Birch and Sunderman (2014) propose that while the use of the IV in the Clapp model
does address the EIV problem, it is subject to a different type of measurement error, omitted
variable bias (OVB). In this case, the authors argue that earlier models of vertical inequity are
taken at the district level. However, they identify significant neighborhood level effects which,
if not accounted for will subject the model to bias. They extend the Clapp model to address these
neighborhood effects through the use of three equations. In calculating the Birch-Sunderman
model, the first equation is the second stage of the Clapp model, and is therefore referred to as
Equation (2) in their paper:
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Ln 𝑆 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑑 Ln 𝐴∗
This result is still at the district level. The authors note that to include the omitted
neighborhood level variables requires the calculation of horizontal and vertical inequity
estimates at the neighborhood, as opposed to district, level. To measure neighborhood net
horizontal inequity, the authors modify what they refer to as the Clapp (1990) pure district
vertical inequity equation. The authors describe this step; “we add a set of standard dummy
variables to the right side of the Clapp (1990) pure district vertical inequity equation. The
resulting regression equation will generate a set of neighborhood treatment coefficients
(neighborhood horizontal inequity coefficients) net of the value effect caused by district vertical
inequity” (Birch and Sunderman, 2014, 91). This equation is pictured here and labelled Equation
(3) in their paper.

In this model, the left-hand side 𝐿𝑛𝑆 is the same as in Equation (2), i.e., the natural log of the sale
price. On the right-hand side, 𝑐0 is the intercept. The second term includes the 𝑐0𝑗 coefficient
which is a neighborhood level variable. According to Birch and Sunderman, it measures “the
relative treatment of individual neighborhoods after district value effects have been removed,
and the extent of differences in these coefficients is a measure of the neighborhood variation in
A-S ratios net of pure district vertical inequity effects” (Birch Sunderman 1990, 92). The other
element in the second term is 𝐷𝑗 , which is a neighborhood level dummy (representing each
neighborhood from the first through the 𝑗𝑡ℎ, where 𝐷𝑗 = 1 if there is a sale, else = 0). The final
right-hand side term is 𝑐𝑑 𝐿𝑛𝐴*, where the 𝐿𝑛𝐴* term is as presented in Equation (2) and the 𝑐𝑑
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term provides “an estimate for district vertical inequity, adjusted (by the presence of the dummy
variables) for neighborhood horizontal inequity effects” (Birch Sunderman 1990, 92).
The final equation accounts for net neighborhood vertical inequity identifying that each
neighborhood can contain vertical equity that is driven by both district and neighborhood level
factors.

They describe this stage as Equation (4)

In describing the equation, the authors note that it requires the adjustment of the 𝐿𝑛𝐴* variable,
as previously identified in Equations (2) and (3) as this is a district wide measures, and the
current equation requires a neighborhood level adjustment. The authors describe these new
neighborhood level adjusted values as LnA** and note that it will be adjusted based on the
classification of the neighborhood where the property is located. The authors go on to note that:
“there is a separate set of three such values for each of the neighborhoods the model is
applied to. It should be noted that these LnA** values are not the same as the LnA*
values developed earlier, where the adjustments to get LnA* covered the entire district.
Further, the purpose of these data transformations of LnA is not to find better estimates
of LnA itself, but rather to use these transformations in the estimation process to
eliminate measurement error bias. Once regression coefficients are estimated using these
generated LnA* and LnA** values, any predictions of sales prices using the resulting
fitted model call for the use of the original LnA values”.
“Unlike the estimation of neighborhood gross vertical inequity, to estimate net vertical
inequity within each neighborhood requires a new equation. That equation requires two
sets of dummy variables to obtain estimates for neighborhood vertical inequity and to
allow for the effects of neighborhood horizontal inequity. Since it is net vertical inequity
within neighborhoods that is desired, then the equation must also include a variable for
district vertical inequity. Thus, neighborhood net vertical inequity can be found by
adding these two sets of dummy variables to the right side of the Clapp (1990) equation
(2), thus giving equation (4)” (Birch and Sunderman, 2014 p. 92 – 93).
In their paper they discuss which equation should be used depends on whether or not
inequity is determined at the neighborhood level. If there is no significant horizontal or vertical
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inequity found at the neighborhood, then equation (2) should be used. If there is significant
horizontal, but no vertical inequity at the neighborhood, then equation (3) is appropriate. If,
however, there is both horizontal and vertical inequity at the neighborhood then equation (4)
should be used.
We further direct the reader to Birch, Sunderman and Radetskiy (2017), where the
method is reviewed and where further instruction is given as to how the results generated from
this method can be used to guide specific approaches on using the data to update and refine
assessments to be more reflective of market realities.
The final model to be reviewed in this section is the Coefficient of Price Related Bias
(PRB) which was created by Gloudemans (2011) in response to the EIV problem found in other
models. PRB is referred to as a proxy model because it uses a “property value proxy” which the
author says is computed as “one-half of (time adjusted) sale price plus one-half of appraised
value” (Gloudemans 2011, 5). The PRB is said to measure “the percentage increase (decrease)
in assessment ratios relative to the percentage increase in property values.” (Gloudemans 2011,
5) The regression equation for calculating the PRB is
𝐿𝑁 (𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸)
(𝐴𝑆𝑅 − 𝑀𝐸𝐷)
=
. 693
𝑀𝐸𝐷
where Value = value proxy as described above and is calculated by solving for the LN of
.5(Appraised Value) + .5(Sales Price) and then dividing that term by .693. The authors further
note that in those “if the appraisal level is not close to 1.00, appraisal values can be divided by
the median ratio to ensure that they receive equal weight with sale prices” (Gloudemans 2011,
5). This point is again made later in the paper, when the author notes that if the median A/S ratio
is “meaningfully different from 1.00”, the value term could be calculated as;
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𝐴𝑉
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = .50 (𝑆𝑃) + .50 (
)
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛
This transformation is described as being performed to ensure that AV receives equal weighting
to SP. The value proxy is then divided by.693, which is the natural log for 2 and is used as a
scaling factor, permitting the value proxy to rise by 1, for each doubling in the value calculation.
The independent variable is
𝐴𝑉
( 𝑆𝑃 )

− 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜

ASR is the Assessed Value/Sales ratio and Med is the median ratio and thus the
complete model for the PRB can be represented as;
𝐿𝑁 (𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸)
(𝐴𝑆𝑅 − 𝑀𝐸𝐷)
=
. 693
𝑀𝐸𝐷
The author further provides guidance on the construction of the PRB and its
interpretation. The author notes that “besides capturing percentage changes, the use of
logarithms has the advantage of minimizing the effect of any outliers” and “the PRB indicates
the percentage by which assessment ratios change as value changes by one unit, that is, is
doubled or halved” (Gloudemans 2011, 5). The author provides further guidance by noting that
“A PRB coefficient not significantly different from zero indicates that the null hypothesis of no
price- related bias cannot be rejected. PRB coefficients that differ from zero by meaningful
amounts and that are statistically significant warrant attention”. The author then provides
interpretive guidance regarding the magnitude of the PRB coefficient. The upper and lower
limits for detection of price-related bias, at the .05 confidence level are given as -0.03 to 0.03 and
coefficients that are below -0.05 or greater than 0.05 should be “viewed with suspicion”, again
assuming a confidence level of 0.05 (Gloudemans 2011, 5).
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